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By the fall of 1988, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of the United States
Public Health Service had received reports of more than 75,000 cases of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and in New York City, which has had the
largest number of cases of any city in the nation since the beginning of the epidemic,
the City Department of Health's AIDS Surveillance Unit had received reports of over
17,000 cases.' During an average month in 1982, the City Department of Health
received reports of 31 new cases of AIDS. In an average month during 1987, 312
cases were reported, and monthly figures for early 1988 were higher than the 1987
averages.2 Workplaces around the nation were increasingly affected by AIDS. A
nationwide survey reported early in 1988 that ten percent of the companies
responding to the survey had experienced an employee with AIDS. 3
During 1987, public health officials in New York City noted a change in the
epidemiology of AIDS in the city. Although "sex with man at risk" remained
cumulatively the largest risk classification behavior among men with AIDS since the
epidemic began, "IV drug use" had grown to rival it as a leading risk behavior
among those men whose diagnoses were reported since January 1, 1988, and had
always been the largest risk category among women in New York City.4 The future
of the epidemic, at least in New York City, will be significantly different from its
past. What has been regarded until now as primarily a sexually transmitted disease
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1. Statistical data taken from N.Y. CrrY DEPr. OF HEALTH AIDS SuRvEiLLANCE UNrr, AIDS SuRvEILLANcE UPDATE
1 (Oct. 26, 1988). [hereinafter AIDS UPDATE]. Given the rate of new case reporting, the national figure of 74,566 as of
October 17 would easily have become over 75,000 within a few weeks. As of October 1988, New York City had 23%
of the cases reported in the United States.
2. Id. Preliminary data for 1988 showed the following numbers of new AIDS cases reported: January-June: an
average of 420 cases reported each month; July-444; August-486; September-512. According to the health department,
reporting can lag up to 6 months after diagnosis. Id.
3. See One in Ten Employers Reports Having Employees Suffering From AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28,
at A-9 (Feb. 11, 1988). The survey, undertaken by Alexander & Alexander Consulting Group, was described as "the
largest employer survey to date on the workplace impact of AIDS."
4. Id. at 3. As of October 26, 1988, 59% of reported cases among men were attributed to "sex with man at risk;"
of those reported since January 1, 1988, only 45% fell into that category. Intravenous (IV) drug use as a risk classification
accounted cumulatively for 30% of the cases, but since January 1, 1988, had been implicated in 43% of the cases.
Individuals whose behavior placed them in both risk classifications made up 5% of the cumulative total, but 3% of the
total since January 1, 1988. Suspected heterosexual transmission from women to men in New York City cumulatively
accounted for less than 11% of the cases, and no such cases were reported after January 1, 1988. Heterosexual transmission
from men to women accounted for 24% of the cases among woman since January 1, 1988. Based on the first three months
of reporting in 1988, the New York City Health Department announced in mid-April that gay and bisexual men were no
longer the largest risk group in New York. Health Commissioner Stephen C. Joseph stated: "It has become clear... that
the gay community has made effective progress in reducing the spread of new infection, unlike the IV drug-using
population, where the virus continues to spread virtually unabated." New York Reports a Shift in AIDS Patients, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1988, at A40, col. 1. A special report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York highlights
the shifting nature of the epidemic in New York. AIDS and The Criminal Justice System: A Preliminary Report and
Recommendations, 42 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF mE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 901, 903-07 (Nov. 1987).
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characteristic of gay, white, employed, middle class men 5 is gradually transforming
into a disease characteristic of economically disadvantaged men and women who use
intravenously-administered drugs, a group which is disproportionately black or
Hispanic. 6 Although New York City and its associated metropolitan area may not be
fully representative of the country as a whole, it seems likely that educational efforts
targeted at change in sexual behavior could cause a similar shift in other parts of the
country, at least with regard to new infection. 7
The statutory and judicial response to AIDS in the workplace has been shaped
over the past several years by the advocacy of gay rights and civil liberties
organizations. 8 The emphasis has been on protection from employment discharge and
preservation of employment-related benefits. However, it seems clear that future
responses will have to take into account that many-perhaps most-of those affected
by AIDS will come from chronically unemployed and underemployed groups, groups
with fewer social and economic resources to assist them in combating discrimination
and to ease the adjustment to a life threatening chronic disease.9
The AIDS epidemic is changing in another way. Since the fall of 1986 when
federal health officials announced the first successful trials of an experimental drug
therapy to inhibit replication of the pathogen believed by researchers to be the cause
of immune deficiency in AIDS, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), ° those
persons with AIDS who have access to sufficient resources to obtain the experimental
treatment are likely to be able to live longer with the illness. tI Even if a cure is not
5. See Note, Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals and the Threat of AIDS, 66 N.C.L. REv. 226 (1987).
6. In New York City, a minority of the men reported to have AIDS are white. The cumulative figures as of
October 26, 1988 showed that of the men reported to have AIDS, 29% were black and 25% were Hispanic. An
overwhelming majority of the women reported to have AIDS in New York City are non-white: 52% black and 33%
Hispanic. The racial and ethnic nature of the affected populations in New York is even more starkly illustrated by the
figures on pediatric AIDS: 58% black and 32% Hispanic. In 72% of the pediatric cases, IV drug use by one of the parents
was identified as the probable source of infection. AIDS UPOATE, supra note 1, at 3, 8.
7. Risk behaviors are identified by investigation of the behaviors of persons who become ill from AIDS. On the
basis of the risk behaviors associated with the disease, epidemiologists concluded prior to the discovery of a particular
infectious agent that AIDS was probably spread by a blood-borne agent which was probably not casually transmissable.
In 1983, French researchers isolated a previously unknown virus from the blood of persons with AIDS; in 1984, American
researchers confirmed the presence of a virtually identical virus in the blood of persons with AIDS; in 1985, the Food and
Drug Administration licensed a test for antibodies to this virus, now called Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). While
most researchers believe that HIV infection leads to AIDS, there is some dispute on the point. See Boffey, A Solitary
Dissenter Disputes Cause of AIDS, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1988, at C3, col. 5.
8. The main litigating groups in significant precedential cases have been state affiliates of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the two national gay rights legal organizations, Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., and
National Gay Rights Advocates.
9. This was dramatically brought home to the writer during a conference on "Minorities and AIDS" at Texas
Southern University's Thurgood Marshall School of Law in Houston during September 1987. 1 spoke as part of a panel
on AIDS and employment, emphasizing the possible protections for employees with HIV infection, AIDS Related
Complex (ARC), or AIDS. The first question posed to me concerned the extent to which current employment law might
provide assistance to persons from largely unemployed and underemployed groups.
10. First Drug to Show Promise to be Made Widely Available, 1 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 18, at 8 (Sept. 24,
1986).
11. AIDS is regularly labelled "uniformly fatal" in the mainstream media, but such characterizations are, after all,
relative. Life is "uniformly fatal" in that barring some miraculous scientific discovery, everybody now alive will die
eventually. In characterizing AIDS as a "fatal disease," we assume that somebody diagnosed with AIDS will die from
it within a relatively short period of time. Early in the epidemic, death within 18 months after diagnosis was seen as a
typical outcome. New treatments may lengthen the survival time significantly. According to the New York City
Department of Health figures, as of October 26, 1988, more than half of those diagnosed during the first half of 1987 were
still alive, and some people were still alive who had been diagnosed with AIDS during the earliest years of the epidemic,
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found anytime soon, AIDS may eventually be transformed, in many cases, to a
chronic condition managed by medication rather than a fatal condition terminating in
significantly premature death.' 2
This change will have important ramifications for employment because individ-
uals with AIDS may be able to work for significantly longer periods of time, and may
be less likely (and financially less able) to take disability retirement as an alternative
to continued employment. Longer and better quality survival time will place
significantly increased burdens on public welfare systems unless the survivors who
are able to work can secure and maintain employment and associated health care
benefits. The ability of persons with chronic AIDS conditions to obtain employment
will become a more significant employment law issue in the future' 3 as discrimination
against current employees with AIDS becomes increasingly unacceptable under
accumulating legislative and judicial pronouncements. 14 Consequently, hiring prac-
tices, and especially "AIDS screening" of applicants, will become more central in
discussing AIDS and employment law.
This Article addresses the current status of employees or job applicants with
AIDS, Aids-Related Complex (ARC), or who are seropositive.15 Because existing
employment law as currently administered and enforced is inadequate to deal with the
problems AIDS generates in the workplace, this Article suggests ways in which the
law can be improved to serve the important goal of enhancing the quality of life of
those affected by the epidemic in a manner consistent with the medical and economic
health of our society.
I. DEVELOPING LAW OF AIDS AND EMPLOYMENT:
HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
A. Federal Law
During the first few years of the AIDS epidemic, the most heavily debated legal
question concerning AIDS and employment has been whether AIDS could be
more than six years previously. AIDS UPDATE, supra note 1, at 2. See also, Callen, I Will Survive, Village Voice, May
3, 1988, at 31-35 (anecdotal account of long-term survivors of AIDS).
12. See New Study Sees Lower Costs for AIDS Care, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1988, at B 17, col. 6; Ricklets, Living
With AIDS: Thanks to New Drugs, Patients Are Surviving and Working Longer, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1988, at 1,
col. I.
13. Panelists at the annual meeting of the President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, held May
4 and 5, 1988, in Washington, asserted that the handicapped have the highest rate of unemployment of any minority group
in the United States. Among Handicapped, Mentally Disabled Face Greatest Employment Bias Problems, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at A-5 (May 16, 1988). Persons with AIDS are now routinely recognized as being "handicapped"
for purposes of applicable law and statistical record keeping.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-131.
15. This article is not intended to duplicate prior articles by the author, but to update prior treatment of the
developing case law and to point out areas for further development of the law dealing with AIDS and employment. See
Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYrON L. REv. 681 (1985) [hereinafter
Employment Discrimination]; Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HortsA L. REv. 11 (1985) [hereinafter
AIDS and Employment Law]; Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 109-25
(H. Dalton & S. Burris eds. 1987); Leonard, AIDS as a Handicapping Condition Under Federal and State Employment
Discrimination Laws, in PROCEEDINOS or 40m ANNUAL NATiONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR ch. 12 (N.Y. Univ 1987)
[hereinafter Handicapping Condition].
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conceptualized as a "handicapping condition" 1 6 so as to bring it within the scope of
existing civil rights laws prohibiting employment discrimination against "otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals."' 7 When this question first arose in the context of
AIDS in 1983 and 1984, there were no reported employment law decisions dealing
with the question whether contagious conditions were covered by handicap discrim-
ination laws.
The only published opinion of any relevance to the "contagious condition"
issue at the beginning of the epidemic was New York State Association of Retarded
Children v. Carey,'8 a 1979 Second Circuit decision which dealt with the applica-
bility of section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act' 9 (Act) to a dispute over
whether mentally impaired school children who were infected by hepatitis B virus
(HBV) should be segregated from noninfected mentally impaired students. Advocates
for the infected children predicated federal jurisdiction on their mental impairments,
not their HBV infection, and the court dealt with the case as a matter of
discrimination between mentally impaired children with HBV infection, and children
without mental impairments with HBV infection. 20
In determining whether the mentally impaired children with HBV infection were
"otherwise qualified" to be integrated into the general student population of the
special education program, the court focused on the question whether HBV infection
would pose a significant risk of infection to other students in the program, as to which
the school bore the burden of proof.21 Concluding that competent medical evidence
16. Parry, AIDS as a Handicapping Condition: Part, 9 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITY L. REP. 402 (1985); Parry,
AIDS as a Handicapping Condition: Part II, 10 MENTAL & PHYs. DISABILITY L. REP. 2 (1986).
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(1982). Section 504 does not have the wide ranging private
sector application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Rather, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies by its terms to "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." In
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the Supreme Court construed similar language in Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 to restrict applicability of federal nondiscrimination requirements to the actual program
or activity which receives direct federal money, rather than to all operations of the entity whose program receives the
assistance. The practical effect of Grove City was to narrow applicability of four similarly worded civil rights laws,
including section 504. In 1988, Congress overrode a presidential veto to enact the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
P.L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which was primarily intended to reverse the Grove City ruling. The Restoration Act
has even greater significance for the subject matter of this article, explored in fuller detail infra text accompanying notes
54-71. As to what constitutes federal financial assistance for purposes of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held in
Department ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986), that only direct monetary payments to a
program or activity will subject it to nondiscrimination requirements of section 504. This interpretation was partially
overridden with respect to discrimination against passengers by airlines in the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, P.L.
99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986), but was otherwise left intact by the Restoration Act. See S. REP. No. 100-64, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMW. NEWS 3, 31. The Rehabilitation Act also affects employment
by federal agencies, see 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982), and employment under federal contracts, see 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
As to the former, the Federal Office of Personnel Management issued policy guidelines on dealing with AIDS in the federal
workplace on March 22, 1988. Sections I and H of OPM's AIDS Guidelines for Federal Employers, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 56, at A-10, D-1 (Mar. 23, 1988). The Guidelines adopt nondiscrimination principles consistent with the case
law developments discussed in this article.
Numerous states and localities have enacted civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicaps or
disabilities. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 15, at 690-96 (summary of state handicap discrimination law as
of 1985).
18. 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
20. New York State Assoc., 612 F.2d at 649.
21. Id. at 649-50.
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showed that "the health hazard posed by the hepatitis B carrier children" was no
more "than a remote possibility, ' 22 the court declared that the children were
protected from discriminatory treatment under the Act because "a significant health
risk" would not result from their integration with uninfected, mentally impaired
children in the classroom. 23
Carey turned out to be prophetic with regard to AIDS, even though HBV
infection was not the impairment central to the court's analysis in that opinion. In
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,2 4 the case that brought the
question of contagious conditions as handicaps to the Supreme Court, the Court
adopted in essence the crucial test the Second Circuit had articulated in Carey for
determining whether an infected person was "otherwise qualified" to participate in
a program subject to the Act--"significant risk."5 And, in Chalk v. U.S. District
Court,26 the first federal appellate ruling applying the Act to a dispute over AIDS in
the workplace, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court 27 on precisely this point,
holding that absolute certainty that transmission could not occur from schoolroom or
workplace contact was not necessary in order to provide protection under the law.2 8
But the question of "otherwise qualified" is, of course, the second step in
handicap discrimination law analysis. The first step is determining whether someone
is a "handicapped individual," and the attribution of that status to persons infected
by HIV or suffering AIDS or ARC was only recently firmly established by court
decisions and legislative action.
The earliest reported judicial opinion to apply the Act to AIDS was District 27
Community School Board v. Board of Education,29 a case similar to Carey that
involved a demand by parents that school children with AIDS be excluded from
attending school with uninfected children. 30 The court held that "since [the virus]
destroys certain lymphocytes, a person with AIDS clearly has . . .a 'physical
impairment,'" and is thus within the definition of a "handicapped individual" under
the Act. 3' Further, the court held that a person with a record of infection by HIV would
22. Id. at 650.
23. Id. at 651.
24. 480 U.S. 273 (1987), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 1913 (1987) (tuberculosis is a "handicapping condition" under
section 504).
25. In Arline, the Court stated: "A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to
others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate
that risk." Id. 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
26. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. The district court's opinion, which is not officially published, can be found unofficially reported as Doe v.
Orange County Dep't of Educ., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1579 (C.D.Cal. 1987).
28. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 709. Chalk involved a high school special education teacher with AIDS who was denied
reinstatement to a classroom teaching position after his physician certified him as able to return to work. Id. at 703-04.
Chalk sued for reinstatement under section 504, and moved for a preliminary injunction reinstating him to classroom
teaching pending trial of his case. Id. at 704. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, relying primarily on
an affidavit by a doctor who asserted his "hunch" that all means of HIV transmission had not yet been discovered. Doe
v. Orange County Dep't of Educ., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1579, 1581 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
29. 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
30. Id. 130 Misc.2d at 400-01, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
31. Id. 130 Misc.2d at414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336. Relevant definitions for the terms used in section 504 are contained
in 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); handicapped individuals are defined as persons who have, inter alia, physical impairments,
as well as those with records of such impairments or who are regarded as having such impairments. For a similar analysis
predating the court's decision in District 27, see Employment Discrimination, supra note 15, at 691 (1985).
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be covered by the definitional category of "record of an impairment," 32 and students
with AIDS who "were automatically excluded from school" would be "regarded as
having" an impairment. 33 Thus the court swept into the category of "handicapped
individual" all persons infected by HIV, regardless of whether they had developed
symptoms of ARC or AIDS. 34 Noting the evidence that HBV was "far more con-
tagious" than HIV, 35 the court concluded that exclusion of school children with AIDS
would be inconsistent with the ruling in Carey and violative of section 504.36
In the employment sphere, however, the leading precedent prior to the Supreme
Court's 1987 decision in Arline was the Eleventh Circuit's 1985 decision in that same
case. 37 Gene Arline was discharged as an elementary school teacher after suffering
her third relapse of tuberculosis, which she initially contracted as a teenager. 38 She
sued under section 504, claiming that she was an "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual" who was being excluded from participation in a "program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.' '39 The district court concluded that she was
not handicapped within the meaning of the statute, asserting that "'it's difficult for
this court to conceive that Congress intended contagious diseases to be included
within the definition of a handicapped person . '.4. , 0
The district court needed to speculate about Congress' intent with respect to
inclusion of contagious conditions because the legislative history of the Act is barren
of any expressed consideration of the question. The court of appeals drew the
opposite conclusion to that of the district court from this lack of expressed legislative
intent, noting the broad and vague language Congress used to define handicapped
individuals. The court of appeals then asserted that the critical question, once one
concedes that a particular contagious condition produces impairment or causes a
person to be treated as if they were impaired, is whether the person afflicted with a
contagious condition was "otherwise qualified" to participate in the covered
program. 41 The court of appeals remanded the case for the district court to consider
without clearly articulating a standard by which the district court could weigh the
evidence. 42
Commentators on employment discrimination and AIDS immediately seized
32. District 27, 130 Misc. 2d at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
33. Id. 130 Misc. 2d at 414, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
34. The court prefaced its analysis of the Rehabilitation Act issues with a citation to Carey, acknowledging the
similarity of the cases. Id. 130 Misc. 2d at 413-14, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
35. Id. 130 Misc. 2d at 415, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
36. Id. 130 Misc. 2d at 415-16, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
37. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 772 F.2d 759 (1 1th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
38. Id. at 760.
39. Id. at 760-61.
40. Id. at 759 (quoting the district court opinion).
41. Id. at 764.
42. Id. at 764-65. The court stated:
The court is obligated to scrutinize the evidence before determining whether the defendant's justifications reflect
a well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks and alternatives, or
whether they are simply conclusory statements that are being used to justify reflexive reactions grounded in
ignorance or capitulation to public prejudice.
Id. (citation omitted). The court cited Carey in support of this proposition, but failed expressly to invoke Carey's standard
of significant risk.
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upon the Eleventh Circuit's Arline decision as the key precedent with regard to
AIDS. 43 The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Arline in the spring of 1986, 44
focusing specifically on the question whether a person with a contagious condition
could be a "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act definition,45 set
off more speculation about the applicability of handicap discrimination law to the
AIDS situation. The United States Justice Department (Department) issued a
memorandum a few months after the grant of certiorari, asserting that discrimination
against persons infected with HIV or suffering ARC or AIDS would not be unlawful
if prompted by fears of contagion, however unreasonable such fears might be. 46 The
Department made the same argument with respect to tuberculosis as an amicus in the
Arline case. 47
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,48 rejected the Depart-
ment's argument, agreed with the Eleventh Circuit, and held that the broad purpose
embodied in section 504 justifies extending coverage to persons with contagious
conditions which satisfy the definition of "handicapped individual." The Court also
held that the crucial question is whether the actual risk of contagion is significant
enough to render the individual not "otherwise qualified. ' 49 In determining whether
a person afflicted with a contagious condition was "otherwise qualified," the Court
said that "appropriate weight" must be given to "such legitimate concerns of
grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks." 50 Thus,
the Court clarified the central issue left ambiguous by the Eleventh Circuit: in order
43. See Leonard, The Legal Issues, in AIDS: THE WoKPLACE IssuEs 33 (1985); AIDS and Employment Law, supra
note 15, at 14 n.21, 26 n.75; see also Feerick, AIDS in the Workplace, 195 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1986); Kandel, Current
Developments in EEO-AIDS in the Work Place, 11 E.IsPL. REL. L.J. 678 (1986); Parry, supra note 16; Comment, AIDS
and Employment: An Epidemic Strikes the Workplace and the Law, 8 WHrrnER L. REv. 651 (1986); Comment, AIDS and
Employment Discrimination Under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 425 (1986); Note, AIDS: Does It Qualify as a "Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973?, 61 NoTRE DAMsE L. REv. 572 (1986); Note, Employment Discrimination and AIDS: Is AIDS a Handicap
Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act?, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 649 (1986); Note, Recent Developments: Public Health
and Employment Issues Generated by the AIDS Crisis, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 505 (1986); Recent Developments, 9 HARv.
J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 739 (1986).
44. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
45. Id. In its petition for certiorari, the School Board raised three issues: whether the "contagious, infectious
disease of tuberculosis" constituted a handicap under section 504; whether the small amount of federal aid the district
received subjected it to federal civil rights jurisdiction under section 504, and whether the eleventh amendment would
shield the Board from legal redress in federal court. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1986). The Court granted
certiorari on only the first question, but requested the parties to "brief and argue" as well the question whether someone
"afflicted with the contagious, infectious disease of tuberculosis is precluded from being 'otherwise qualified' from the
job of elementary school teacher, within the meaning of Section 504. ... Arline, 475 U.S. at 1118 (1986). Justice
Stevens dissented from the addition of this second question "before the District Court has an opportunity to make the
findings ordered by the Court of Appeals." Id.
46. Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act to Persons
with AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-I (June 25, 1986). The Cooper Memorandum has been effectively
revoked by a new memorandum. See Justice Department Memorandum On Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section
504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988).
47. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
48. Joining the majority opinion were Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Scalia.
49. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281-88. The Court commented: "Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects
of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others." Id. 480
U.S. at 284.
50. Id. 480 U.S. at 287 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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for a risk of contagion to render an individual not otherwise qualified, it must be
"significant." 5'
Subsequent to Arline, the Chalk decision52 created a firm precedent applying
section 504 to employees with AIDS, and it is clear, from both the Supreme Court's
explanation of its holding in Arline and the Ninth Circuit's discussion of medical
authorities in Chalk, that the Act's protection extends to persons with AIDS or those
likely to encounter discrimination due to their actual or perceived status as "AIDS
virus" carriers. 53
The Arline decision was not without its detractors.5 4 Because of its probable
application to the AIDS situation, some congressional critics attempted to reverse the
decision during consideration of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 5 5 Senator
Gordon J. Humphrey (R., N.H.) proposed an amendment specifically intended to
overrule Arline, but the amendment was defeated in committee by a vote of 14-2.56
On the Senate floor, a compromise was devised by which the Humphrey amendment
became the Harkin-Humphrey amendment, essentially codifying the Supreme
Court's approach in Arline to the "otherwise qualified" issue.57
As enacted, the Harkin-Humphrey amendment provides, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to employment, such term
does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who,
by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety
51. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (discussing Arline in context of Carey at beginning of this section
of article). On remand for trial, Gene Arline was reinstated as an elementary school teacher. Arline v. School Bd. of
Nassau County, Fla., 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
52. Chalk v. U.S. District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
53. The Supreme Court specifically reserved the question whether an asymptomatic carrier of a contagious disease
could be considered "impaired" as required by the Rehabilitation Act definition, since the question was not presented by
Ms. Arline's case. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7. However, subsequent decisions seem to answer the question affirmatively.
See, e.g., Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987)
(diplomatic personnel and applicants who test positive for HIV antibodies considered handicapped individuals for
purposes of analysis under Rehabilitation Act, but found not otherwise qualified for overseas assignment). This is
consistent with the purpose of the Act, since discrimination motivated by fear of contagion, regardless whether the
individual has outward symptoms of illness, is precisely the sort of discrimination at which the Act is aimed. See
Handicapping Condition, supra note 15, at § 12.0412]; Note, Asymptomatlic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap
Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 CoL. L. REv. 563 (1988). See also, Doe v. Centinela Hospital, 57 U.S.L.W.
2034 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 1988) (Relief against discrimination was granted to a man who had been discharged from an
alcoholism rehabilitation program for testing seropositive.). The foregoing interpretation of federal law now has the
imprimatur of the Justice Department, see Justice Department Memorandum On Application of Rehabilitation Act's
Section 504 to Hi V-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-I (Oct. 7, 1988).
54. Its first detractors were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, who dissented from the Court's decision.
Rehnquist endorsed the Justice Department's argument that exclusion of somebody from a workplace because of fear of
contagion is not discrimination "by reason of. . . handicap." Arline, 480 U.S. at 291 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
Rehnquist also noted the lack of any evidence in legislative history or subsequent regulatory materials that Congress
intended to include persons with contagious conditions under section 504's coverage. Id. 480 U.S. at 292-93 (Rehnquist,
C.J. dissenting).
55. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 29, 31-32 (1988). The pertinent portions of the Act relevant to this article are
section 4, which adds to section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794, a definition of the term "program or activity" for the purposes
of overruling the Grove City case, see supra note 18; and section 9, which amends section 7(8), 29 U.S.C. § 706(8), to
clarify the application of section 503 (federal contractors) and section 504 (federal financial recipients) to persons impaired
by contagious conditions.
56. S. RE'. No. 100-64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CON. & AD.suM. NEws 3, 33.
57. 134 CONG. REc. S256-57 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
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of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is
unable to perform the duties of the job.59
The phrase "would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individ-
uals" seems to create new ambiguity. 59 Under the Arline decision, section 504 protects
an infected individual unless that individual's condition would create a significant risk
of workplace contagion. 6° Does the "constitute a direct threat" standard contained in
the Restoration Act work any change in the standard the Court enunciated in Arline?
To clarify the meaning of this "clarification" of the Rehabilitation Act, Senators
Tom Harkin (D., Iowa) and Gordon Humphrey read a prepared colloquy into the
record, consisting of several questions and answers. 6' Unfortunately, the colloquy
does not provide any enlightenment on the issue of the appropriate test for a court to
apply in a section 504 case because no attempt is made to define the phrase
"constitute a direct threat." However, the colloquy does make clear that with regard
to the issue of "reasonable accommodation" of handicaps attributable to contagious
conditions, the amendment does not change existing law as set forth in Arline.62
Consideration of the Restoration Act in the House of Representatives provides
more direct evidence of an intent in that chamber to codify the Arline standard in
section 9 of the Restoration Act. 63 Many proponents of the legislation inserted
statements in the record making clear their understanding that section 9 would
provide protection against discrimination for persons with AIDS, some specifically
58. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 29, 31-32 (1988) (to be codified at 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)).
59. At least one commentator, evidently unaware of the legislative history recounted above, has asserted: "Under
a strict interpretation of the Harkin-Humphrey amendment, employers now may have a less restrictive burden to meet in
defending against AIDS-related employment discrimination suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act." Hentoff, A Le-
gal Virus on Top of the AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1988, at A31, col. 2. Mr. Hentoff, a law student, also asserts
that the Harkin-Humphrey amendment removes any requirement for employers to "accommodate" people infected by the
"AIDS virs." Hentoff's interpretation is not mandated by the language of the amendment, and is contrary to the
legislative history, see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. His views are developed at greater length in Note, The
Rehabilitation Act's Otherwise Qualified Requirement and the AIDS Virus: Protecting the Public From AIDS-Related
Health and Safety Hazards, 30 ARiz. L. Rev. 571 (1988).
60. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
61. 134 CONG. REc. S256-57 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
62. Since the colloquy may become important in future interpretation of sections 503 and 504, its pertinent text is
reproduced here:
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I would like to address several questions to the Senator from Iowa, relative
to his understanding of this amendment...
Is it your understanding that this amendment is designed to address an issue comparable to the one faced
by Congress in 1978 with regard to coverage of alcohol and drug abusers under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act? That is, Congress wishes to assure employers that they are not required to retain or hire individuals with
a contagious disease or infection when such individuals pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals or cannot perform the essential duties of a job. Mr. HARKIN. If the Senator would yield, yes,
Senator, that is my understanding. Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator for that response. Inquiring further,
is it the Senator's understanding that this amendment does nothing to change the current laws regarding
reasonable accommodation as it applies to individuals with handicaps... ?... Mr. HARKIN.... Yes, indeed,
that is my understanding. Mr. HUMPHREY. Finally, is it the Senator's understanding, as we stated in 1978
with respect to alcohol and drug abusers, that the two-step process in section 504 applies in the situation under
which it was first determined that a person was handicapped and then it is determined that a person is otherwise
qualified? Mr. HARKIN. Yes. I do understand-yes, that is my understanding.
134 CONG. REc. S256-57 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988) (nonsubstantive portions omitted). For a discussion of existing law
on "reasonable accommodation," see infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
63. House floor debate occurred on March 2, 1988. 134 CONG. REC. H565 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988).
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referring to the Arline standard of "significant risk.'' 64 A leading opponent of the
Restoration Act argued against the bill because of his understanding that it would
leave the Arline interpretation in place instead of overruling it.65
Consequently, it seems likely that the Restoration Act works no change in the
law regarding AIDS and employment under the Rehabilitation Act, at least as
developed so far in cases depending upon Arline as precedent. 66 If anything, the
Harkin-Humphrey amendment preserves the Arline approach from subsequent
judicial redefinition by writing it directly into the statute. This is a flexible approach
to the issue of "otherwise qualified," because the Supreme Court clearly conditioned
the degree of protection afforded an employee with a contagious condition upon
developing medical knowledge and the possibility of accommodating the handicap of
the employee. 67
The Arline decision was significant not only with respect to the definition of
"handicapped individual" and "otherwise qualified," but also with respect to the
issue of "reasonable accommodation." Section 504 makes no mention of any
requirement that employers accommodate the handicaps of otherwise qualified
applicants or employees, but subsequent regulations sought to impose that require-
ment administratively. 68 In Arline, the Court specified that: "[e]mployers have an
affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped
64. See 134 Co.o. REc. H565-66 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Garcia); 134 Co,o. Rac. H566
(daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (Statement of Rep. Hayes); ("The bill also codifies court rulings that provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act that prohibit employment discrimination against disabled persons applies to those with a contagious
disease or infection (such as AIDS), unless the disease constitutes a direct threat to the health or safety of others or the
disease prevents them from performing their jobs."); 134 CONo. REc. H567-68 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (Statement by
Rep. Hawkins) ("This amendment is consistent with the holding and standards announced by the Supreme Court in the
recent case of School Board of Nassau County versus Arline... It is important to note that the purpose of the amendment
is to clarify, and not to modify or alter, the substantive protections afforded individuals with contagious diseases and
infections under the Rehabilitation Act."); 134 CONO. REc. H569 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (Statement of Rep. Miller);
134 CONG. REc. H571 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement by Rep. Jeffords) ("[t]he Harkin-Humphrey amendment places
within the terms of the Rehabilitation Act the otherwise qualified standard now set forth in regulations and case law. In
brief, the Harkin-Humphrey amendment adopts the approach and standards of the Supreme Court's Arline decision ....
[Tlhere would have to be a determination that there is a significant risk of transmission of the disease or infection to others
in the work place, a risk which could not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation."); 134 CONG. REc. H573 (daily
ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss) ("The basic manner in which individuals with contagious diseases and
infections can present a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace is if there is a significant risk that
the individual could transmit the contagious disease or infection to other individuals... [Tihe amendment does nothing
to change the requirements in the regulations and case law regarding providing reasonable accommodations for persons
with contagious diseases or infections .... "); 134 CoNM. Rec. H574 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Owens)
("With or without this statutory amendment, under current law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court last year in School
Board of Nassau County versus Arline, the standards applied in any given case would be the same."); 134 Co.NG. REc.
H575 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("While this legislation does not make substantive change
in the law as it has been interpreted by both the Supreme Court and lower courts, it does add some clarity to those
holdings.").
65. 134 CONo. REc. H579-80 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
66. The draft report prepared for consideration by the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic by its
Chairman, Admiral James Watkins, reaches this conclusion: "It appears that this amendment is in concert with the Arline
decision and codifies the existing standards applicable to Section 504.'" See Excerpts from Draft Recommendations
Prepared by Chairman of the President's Commission on AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D-l, D-5 (June 3,
1988).
67. The Court adopted an analytical framework proposed in an amicus curiae brief filed by the American Medical
Association, which asserted that the decision should be based on "reasonable medical judgments given the state of
medical knowledge," and that courts should defer to the judgments of public health officials. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
68. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985).
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employee.''69 Referring to its earlier decisions under section 504, the Court
elucidated the scope of the accommodation requirement in a lengthy footnote which
implicitly places the imprimatur of the Court on existing regulations. 70 These
regulations specify that an accommodation will be considered unreasonable if it
imposes "undue financial and administrative burdens" on a federal funding
recipient, or requires "'a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program.' ",71
As such, it is clear that the accommodation requirement is limited in scope, since
significant inconvenience or expense may not be required. What this will mean in
practical terms for employees affected by AIDS is unclear, but the current medical
evidence indicates that no particular changes are necessary in the typical workplace
to protect coworkers or members of the public from exposure to HIV through casual
contact with infected employees. 72
B. State and Local Laws
Almost all the states and some county and municipal jurisdictions have laws or
ordinances forbidding handicap discrimination. 73 Most of these apply broadly
throughout the private sector. During the past few years, there have been several
important administrative 74 and judicial decisions 75 establishing that most of these
laws will provide some protection to persons suffering employment discrimination
because of AIDS.76 In a few jurisdictions, however, the handicap discrimination laws
69. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n.19.
70. Id. 480 U.S. at 287 n. 17.
71. Id. (quoting from Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979), and referring to 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1985) and 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A (1985)).
72. For an example of an accommodation scheme devised to settle an employment discrimination case brought by
a neurologist with AIDS who had been restricted from hospital privileges, see Neurologist with AIDS Reaches Agreement
with Cook Counry Hospital on Work Practices, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at A-3 (Mar. 3, 1988).
73. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 15, at 689-96 (1985); AIDS and Employment Law, supra note 15,
at 21 n.52 (1985); AIDS LEGAL GUIDE 2-1-2-2 (A. Rubenfeld ed. 1988).
74. Perhaps the most important administrative decisions were Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget
and Mgm't Pol'y, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 5014 (1986), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242, at E-I (Dec. 17, 1985)
(Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, Dec. 11, 1985) (first published administration decision holding employment
discrimination against a person with AIDS to be violative of state handicap discrimination law); Racine Educ. Ass'n v.
Racine United School Dist., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at E-1 (May 21, 1988) (Wis. Dep't Indus. Lab. Human
Relations, Apr. 30, 1986) (AIDS exclusionary policy adopted by School Board violates state law against discrimination
on the basis of handicap or sexual orientation); Department of Fair Empl. and Housing v. Raytheon Co., Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 29, at E-I (Feb. 13, 1987) (Cal. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., Feb. 5, 1987), aff'd, 46 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1988) (refusal to allow employee with AIDS to resume work violates state handicap
discrimination law; preliminary, injunctive relief would be appropriate in future cases of AIDS-related employment
discrimination, given shortened expected lifespan of persons with AIDS); Isbell v. Sebastian's, West Virginia Human
Rights Comm'n (Jan. 15, 1988) (discussed in First TV.Va. AIDS Bias Case Is Won by Waiter in Parkersburg, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-2 (Feb. 3, 1988) (waiter unlawfully discharged after presenting doctor's report showing he was
scropositive; employer allegedly told waiter he was fired because of rumors he had AIDS).
75. Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting
motion to dismiss handicap discrimination claim by telephone lineman with AIDS alleging constructive discharge; also
upholding count in violation of Massachusetts privacy statute for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information by
company officials); Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super.
Ct., 1988) (affirming Commission decision against employer in AIDS-discrimination case). The Raytheon decision
provides the most exhaustive discussion of medical evidence in any judicial opinion published at the time of writing.
76. Perhaps the most significant of these recent decisions is Raytheon, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1988), in which a California Superior Court judge noted the broadly remedial scope of California handicap
discrimination law as defined in American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair EmpI. and Housing Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1982) (man with high blood pressure protected from employment discrimination as handicapped) and held that
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specifically exclude coverage for persons with contagious diseases77 or have received
interpretations placing in doubt their efficacy in protecting persons with HIV
infection or milder cases of ARC who encounter discrimination. 78
Several states and cities have passed statutes specifically dealing with AIDS and
employment. In California, 79 Florida,80 Maine,"' Massachusetts, 82 Texas, 83
Vermont, 84 and Washington, 85 it is unlawful for employers to demand HIV antibody
tests of applicants for employment or current employees. 86 Municipal ordinances
have been enacted in several large California cities, 87 as well as Austin, Texas. 88
Also, mayors, municipal councils, and state agencies have proclaimed nondiscrim-
ination policies with respect to state and local employment. 89
Although state and local laws vary in their language and interpretation, there are
few states where AIDS related discrimination would not be covered to some extent.
exclusion of a person with AIDS from the workplace at a time when his doctor had authorized return to work was unlawful
under Govt. Code § 12926(H). Raytheon, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1094.
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b)(2) (1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.140(2)(c) (Baldwin 1981); TEN. CODE
ANN. § 8-50-103(c) (Supp. 1987). An argument can and should be made that such laws should be interpreted only to
exempt from coverage handicapping conditions which are transmissable under workplace circumstances, but it is
uncertain whether such arguments would be successful.
78. In Wolfe v. Tidewater Pizza, Inc., No. C87-662 (Cir. Ct., Norfolk, Va. 1987) a trial judge held that the
Virginia Rights of Persons With Disabilities Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.01-40 (Michie 1987) provided no protections for
persons not actually impaired. The case involved an employee who was suspended from work for four weeks due to
rumors that he had AIDS. The employer required him to present a doctor's certification that he was not infected by HIV.
An appeal is pending before the Virginia Supreme Court. See 2 LAMBDA AIDS UPDATE 3-4 (June/July 1987); 2 LAMBDA
AIDS UPDATE 4 (Oct. 1987).
Similarly, in Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1987), the Texas Supreme Court adopted a
restrictive definition of handicap, limiting protection to "persons with impairments of an incapacitating nature," or,
alternatively stated, "in order for a disability to be considered a handicap in the first place it must be one which is
generally perceived as severely limiting him in performing work-related functions in general." Id. at 318. The case
involved a person with a slight visual impairment which resulted in disqualification for employment as a laborer. The
approach taken by the Texas court seems likely to restrict the protection of Texas handicap discrimination law to persons
severely incapacitated by symptoms of ARC or AIDS; unfortunately, those persons are unlikely to be "otherwise
qualified" to work, meaning that Texas handicap discrimination law may actually provide little protection unless either
the state legislature is willing to overrule the case or the court reconsiders its precedential value in a case involving HIV
related discrimination.
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 199.22 (Vest 1979).
80. 1988 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 88-380, § 43 (West).
81. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19201-06 (Supp. 1987).
82. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11l, § 70F (Law. Co-op Supp. 1988).
83. 'Ix. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
84. H. 239, enacted May 9, 1988, effective July 1, 1988. See Vermont Bans HIV Status Discrimination in
Employment, Education, Health Care, 95 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at A-10 (May 17, 1988).
85. 1988 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 206, § 903 (West).
86. The listed states all have statutes which either expressly or by clear implication would forbid employers from
demanding HIV tests. Of course, in all states with handicap discrimination laws applicable to the AIDS situation, it is
likely that such testing would be unlawful.
87. Municipal ordinances are normally not published in the commercial reporting services upon which employment
law researchers rely. Due to extraordinary interest in AIDS, however, the CCH Employment Practices Manual has
published the Los Angeles and San Francisco ordinances. Los ANGELES, CAL. OPrDiN cE No. 160289 (Aug. 16, 1985),
reprinted in, 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 20,950A (1985); SAN FRANcISco, CAL. ORDINANcE No. 49985 (Dec. 20, 1985),
reprinted in, 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) t 20, 950B (1985).
88. AUSTIN, TEx. CODE §§ 7-4-120 - 133 (1986).
89. Agencies or executives who have promulgated such policies include the Mayor of Boston, Massachusetts, the
Minnesota Department of Employee Relations, the Missouri Department of Health, and the Denver, Colorado, city
council. See Individual Employee Rights Manual, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 9A, at 509:206 (Feb. 1988).
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Nevertheless, a national legislative solution is needed to compensate for the gaps in
state and local law. 90
C. The Limitations of Handicap Discrimination Law
One of the main limitations of handicap discrimination law in meeting the
legitimate needs of people affected by AIDS is the lack of a national standard for
disability discrimination laws. As noted above, the Federal Rehabilitation Act
reaches only employers with federal contracts or receiving federal money, leaving
large gaps in coverage, and some states do not provide protection against handicap
discrimination in the private sector.
Early in 1988, it appeared that this gap in federal coverage might be filled by the
AIDS Federal Policy Act of 1987.91 As introduced in the House of Representatives
on July 30, 1987, with 43 bipartisan co-sponsors, this bill would have amended the
Public Health Service Act92 to forbid discrimination in employment against otherwise
qualified individuals if the discrimination was based on their infection with "the
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome.' '93 The bill would have
also expanded the federal effort for voluntary HIV antibody testing and counseling,
which, in fact, was the main focus of the bill. On May 26, 1988, this bill received
overwhelming approval from the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment, but with the antidiscrimination provisions removed due to a perceived lack of
support for this part of the bill in the full House. 94
Another bill, more sweeping in its potential impact, would amend various titles
of the Civil Rights Act of 196495 to include physical and mental disabilities on the list
of forbidden bases for discrimination in employment and public accommodations. 96
90. A prime example of this problem is Tennessee, where the legislature amended the state's handicap
discrimination law in 1987 to exclude contagious diseases from the definition of handicap in reaction to the Arline
decision. The legislature amended Tennessee Statute § 8-50-103 to add subsection (c), which excludes from coverage as
a handicap "any disease or condition which is infectious, contagious or similarly transmittable to other persons." See
Te.a,,. CODE ANN. §8-50-103(c) (1987). Inaccurate legislative perceptions of the contagion issue have been a significant
stumbling block in pursuing rational policies with regard to AIDS. Other states which specifically exclude contagious
conditions from civil rights law coverage are noted supra note 77. Of course, a small number of states lack handicap
discrimination law coverage in general.
91. H.R. 3071, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300cc-15 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), would be amended by adding a new Title XXIII -
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, beginning with 42 U.S.C. § 2301.
93. Proposed 42 U.S.C. § 2341(a)(1), H.R. 3071, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), as introduced. The bill would
also have reinforced existing protections under the Rehabilitation Act in proposed 42 U.S.C. § 2341(a)(2), which would
have forbidden discrimination based on "AIDS" infection by any program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance. The proposal built in the Arline standard for "otherwise qualified" in proposed § 2341(b), by providing an
exception to the bill's protections where "a public health officer makes a bona fide medical determination that the
individual will, under the circumstances involved, expose other individuals to a significant possibility of being infected
with such etiologic agent...'" (emphasis supplied). The companion bill in the Senate, introduced by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, is S. 1575.
94. House Subcommittee Approves AIDS Counseling, Testing Measure, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at A-4
(June 1, 1988). According to BNA's report, the antidiscrimination provisions were dropped from the bill as part of
negotiations over 14 amendments proposed by Rep. Dannemeyer. The measure eventually passed the Congress, but
missing the provisions covering discrimination and confidentiality of HIV antibody test results. See Molotsky, Congress
Passes Compromise AIDS Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at A12, col. 1.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
96. The companion bills are H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 29, 1988), and S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Apr. 28, 1988). The bills have bipartisan sponsorship in both houses. See Comprehensive Handicapped Civil Rights
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This would essentially replicate at the level of federal commerce power the general
jurisdictional sweep of state handicap discrimination laws in those jurisdictions which
have such laws. 97
However, extending handicap discrimination laws as currently interpreted and
administered throughout the private sector will not necessarily solve the problem.
Professor Wendy Parmet has noted in a perceptive article 98 that placing AIDS and
AIDS related statuses within the scope of handicap discrimination law does not
provide a comprehensive solution to the work related problems people with AIDS
confront. This is partly due to one of the basic premises of handicap discrimination
law: protection is provided only to persons who are otherwise qualified to be present
in the workplace, 99 and the accommodations which employers can be required to
make in order to render handicapped persons able to perform their jobs are relatively
limited. 100 Thus, as soon as a person with AIDS becomes too debilitated to work, or
finds it impossible to maintain acceptable attendance or levels of physical effort,
protection from handicap discrimination law, including protection for work related
benefits, may cease.
A recent decision by the Eighth Circuit in Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys'
Home'0 ' illustrates this limitation. Boys' Home provided employees with three
benefits relevant to the case: disability insurance, a salary continuation program for
temporarily disabled employees, and health and dental benefits.' 0 2 Beauford, an
employee who became unable to work due to physical and emotional ailments, was
discharged by Boys' Home. An arbitrator overruled the discharge and restored her
employment status, but she remained unable to work. She applied for all three
enumerated benefits, but was awarded only disability insurance; the employer
claimed she "was denied salary continuation and health insurance because she would
not submit to a physical examination." 0 3 Beauford charged discrimination violative
of section 504.104
The court of appeals held that the denial of benefits was not covered under
section 504 because Beauford was not an "'otherwise qualified handicapped
individual.' "105 She was unable to work due to physical and mental impairments;
Bill with Bi-partisan Backing Introduced in House, Senate, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 84, at A-8 (May 2, 1988). In
addition to employment, these bills would forbid handicap discrimination in public accommodations and transportation.
97. The final report for the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic strongly endorses establishment of a
national policy on handicap discrimination by passage of the pending Americans With Disabilities bill. See Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D-1, D-5 (June 3, 1988); Boffey, AIDS Panel's Chief UrgesBan on Bias Against Infected, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1988, at A-l, col.6. See also Reagan Pledges Follow-up on Group's Final Report, 3 AIDS Pol'y & L.
(BNA) No. 12, at 2 (June 29, 1988).
98. Parmet, AIDS and the Limits of Discrimination Law, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CA 61 (Summer 1987).
99. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
100. Parmet, supra note 98, at 62-64. The Supreme Court emphasized these limitations in Arline when it reiterated
earlier holdings that "accommodation" requirements were limited in cost and did not require substantial changes in work
duties or transfers to less demanding positions (unless such transfers were normally available to similarly situated
employees under the employer's usual policies.) Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 nn.16-17, 289 n.19.
101. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 770.
103. Id.
104. Boys' Home received federal funding, and was thus subject to section 504 nondiscrimination requirements. Id.
at 770.
105. Id. at 772 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
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consequently, she could not be considered otherwise qualified, even though she was
also quite obviously a "handicapped person" as defined by the Act. 106
Beauford argued that regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services 10 7 required employers not to deprive handicapped employees of
benefits, even though they were not otherwise qualified to work. The regulations
defined "qualified handicapped person" to mean:
(1) With respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the job in question;... (4) With respect to other
services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of such services. 0 3
Boys' Home argued that because Beauford could not perform the "essential functions
of the job," she was not otherwise qualified. She replied that the "other services"
portion of the regulation was applicable; as a disabled employee, she claimed to have
met the "essential eligibility requirements" for the salary continuation and health
insurance programs offered by her employer, precisely because she was unable to
work.10 9
The court of appeals rejected Beauford's argument, asserting that "the statutory
language extends its protection only to the ambit of a potentially functional
employment relationship," and that the portion of the regulation upon which
Beauford relied had to do not with entitlement to employee benefits, but rather with
the "wholely [sic] unrelated topic of discrimination by health, welfare and social
services providers toward applicants trying to obtain these types of services." 1 0 In
essence, the court held that once an employee became unable to work, handicap
discrimination law would provide no assistance in securing the work related benefits
specifically designed to assist employees who became unable to work.",
This interpretation of the protection afforded by section 504 is narrow and
literal. The concept of employment discrimination has long embraced not only equal
treatment with respect to hiring, promotion, and discharge, but also equal treatment
with respect to other terms and conditions of employment, such as fringe benefits. 112
If handicap discrimination law protection is interpreted to cease entirely when
106. Id. at 771.
107. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1987).
108. Id.
109. Beauford, 831 F.2d at 771.
110. Id. at 772.
111. The court of appeals summarized its holding as follows:
Discrimination in the handling of salary continuation and health and dental benefits due handicapped employees
unable to perform the essential functions of their jobs is an undesirable thing. However, in the end, protection
from such discrimination is simply not contemplated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at 773. The court noted, however, that the employee could pursue a claim that denial of such benefits breached her
employment contract. Such a claim would have to be dealt with in state court, and would naturally depend on whether
her state recognized such a cause of action for a person in her circumstances. Alternatively, and surprisingly unmentioned
by the court, is the possibility that Beauford could pursue her rights under a different federal statute, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982), see infra text accompanying notes 149-83.
112. Parmet, supra note 98, at 62-64. Professor Parmet notes that the courts have had difficulties applying generally
established principles of employment discrimination law to the handicapped, precisely because of the requirement of the
statutes that persons with handicaps be fully able, apart from their handicaps, to perform the normal requirements of a job
before they can be deemed "qualified" and thus protected from discrimination.
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employees' impairments render them unable to work, many persons with handicaps
will find little assistance from these laws, and one of the laws' articulated purposes-
reducing the dependency of handicapped persons on public assistance' 3-will be
severely undermined. The opportunity to benefit from a salary continuation program
or a health insurance program is not the employer's gift; it is deferred compensation
earned by working. Denial of such benefits after a person is no longer able to work
is discrimination on the basis of the particular condition which gives rise to the
disqualification because it is unlikely that employers would routinely deny such
entitlements to all those who become eligible for them.
The Beauford court was correct in its reading of the regulation concerning
"other services," but its narrow approach to the issue of what constitutes discrimi-
nation with regard to an employee who is undoubtedly a "handicapped person"
within the meaning of the statute, is restrictive and unimaginative. This narrow
interpretation also illustrates how the general approach of the federal courts to
handicap discrimination law undermines the important social goals underlying
handicap statutes. t14
Handicap discrimination law has another significant drawback when it comes to
protecting the interests of employees affected by AIDS. Because of its limited
remedial nature," t5 handicap discrimination law may not be much of a deterrent to
employers determined to remove people perceived to present a threat of AIDS from
their workplaces. Even if a court later orders the employer to reinstate the employee,
such a result is unlikely to occur for a considerable period of time, and it is possible
that in the interim the employee will have died from AIDS or become so disabled that
reinstatement cannot occur.
For example, in the leading California case, Raytheon Company v. Fair
Employment and Housing Commission,"t6 John Chadbourne, an employee with
AIDS, was excluded from the workplace early in 1984, even though his doctor said
he could return to work and public health officials consulted by the company
113. The Congressional declaration of policy in the Rehabilitation Act speaks of "independent living" as a specific
goal of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
114. As noted previously, supra note 111, the court does suggest an alternative remedy based on a contract theory,
but fails to mention either the possible alternative remedies based on ERISA, or the looming issue of ERISA preemption
of such common law suits. See infra text accompanying notes 135-85.
115. Remedies available under handicap discrimination law vary depending upon the statute governing the case. 29
U.S.C. § 794a (1982) provides that remedies available under section 504 be the same as those available under Tite VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (a jurisdictionally similar
statute forbidding discriminatory practices by programs receiving federal funding), but the remedial scope of Title VI is
not ideally clear, at least according to one court attempting to cope with this issue in an AIDS discrimination case.
Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F.Supp. 35, 36-37 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (granting motion to dismiss claim for damages
for mental suffering or humiliation on account of AIDS-related employment discrimination under section 504). Generally,
federal employment discrimination law has limited individual remedial relief to reinstatement with or without backpay,
perhaps accompanied by lost fringe benefits, interest, and attorneys' fees. Id. at 37-38. State laws vary with respect to
their remedial scope. In New York, the Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297(4)(c) (McKinney 1982), provides for
"compensatory damages," which may include payment for mental anguish and damage to reputation in addition to lost
wages.
The Beauford decision, supra text accompanying notes 101-11, raises, at least by implication, the possibility that
remedial coverage for benefits to which the employee was entitled might only be available for those times when the
employee remained able to work (or at least was only temporarily disabled), thus rendering that portion of the remedy
virtually useless for persons with more permanent disabilities.
116. 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1988).
[Vol. 49:929
1989] AIDS, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 945
confirmed that his presence in the workplace would not present a significant risk to
other employees."i 7 He filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing on April 24, 1984,118 at which time he was able to work.
By the end of July 1984, he was no longer physically able to work full time, even
though he continued to work on an occasional basis as an AIDS service volunteer
until October 1984, and he died early in January 1985.119 In effect, he was excluded
from working for Raytheon during a period of six months when he was physically
able to work.
On August 4, 1986, an administrative law judge (AiU), ruling on a matter of
first impression, held in Chadbourne's case that California handicap discrimination
law did not apply because not enough was known in early 1984 about the
transmissability of AIDS to justify requiring Raytheon to have reinstated Chadbourne
at that time. 120 The ALJ's decision was subsequently reversed by the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission (Commission) in October 1986, and after briefing
and further consideration, the Commission issued its opinion on February 5, 1987,
ordering backpay to the estate of Chadbourne in the amount of $4,359.60 with
interest beginning from January 20, 1984, the date Chadbourne was refused
reinstatement. 121 The Commission also opined that in future cases of AIDS related
employment discrimination, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing should
consider seeking interim injunctive relief so that the complainant could be employed
while still in good health. 122
Raytheon appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which ruled more than a
year later that Raytheon had indeed violated California law by excluding Chadbourne
from the workplace from January 20, 1984, until he became too impaired by AIDS
to work toward the end of July 1984.123 Even had Chadbourne exceeded the average
lifespan of a person diagnosed with AIDS in 1984, he probably would not have lived
to gain eventual reinstatement. The Superior Court decision came about four years
after his complaint was filed. 124
Unfortunately, the California Raytheon case is typical of the slow speed with
which many early AIDS employment discrimination cases have been handled. 125 The
117. Id. at 1100-01.
118. Department of Fair Empl. and Housing v. Raytheon Co., Case No. FEP 83-84 L1-031p, slip op. at 2 (Aug.
4, 1986) (Lopez, A.L.J.) (slip opinion in possession of the author).
119. Id.
120. The judge also noted a similar ruling by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in a parallel
complaint filed by Chadbourne under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 9-10.
121. The Commission refused to award compensatory or punitive damages, although such are available under
California law in appropriate cases. Department of Fair Empl. and Housing v. Raytheon Co., Daily Lab. Rep. No. 29,
at E-l. E-6-E-8 (Feb. 13, 1987).
122. Id. at E-8. "Substantial and irreparable harm will occur, both to the complainant and the public interest in
effective enforcement of the Act, without such relief, and there is clearly a substantial probability that the Department will
ultimately prevail on the merits of such cases, where only casual co-worker contact is involved." Id.
123. Raytheon Co. v. Fair Empl. and Housing Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1089 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1988). The court did not address the remedial issues, particularly with regard to interim injunctive relief, which had
been raised by the Commission's opinion. Raytheon has filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal.
124. The Superior Court decision was issued April 22, 1988. Id.
125. Of course, the numerous settlements of employment discrimination charges, not officially reported because not
resulting in opinions by courts or agencies, undoubtedly occur much more expeditiously than the resolution of a fully
litigated matter.
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first case of AIDS related employment discrimination processed by the Office for
Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health and Human Services under
section 504 of the Act took over two years from the filing of the complaint to issuance
of a letter finding probable cause to believe the law had been violated. By the time
the letter was issued, the complainant had died. 126 Similarly, the first AIDS
employment discrimination case to go through the full hearing process before the
New York State Division of Human Rights was filed in 1986. Hearings before an
administrative law judge were still taking place in May of 1988, although the
complainant had died during the fall of 1987.127 While the accumulating precedents
on the workplace rights of persons affected by AIDS make it likely that later cases
will be somewhat less time consuming, these examples are unfortunately typical in
many ways of the delays inherent in administrative processing of complaints.
The best method of circumventing the time lags inherent in administrative
procedures is the method suggested by the California Commission in Raytheon 28 and
used by plaintiff's lawyers in Chalk:129 a demand for temporary injunctive relief,
restoring the individual to work pending the trial of the case. As the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the appropriateness of preliminary injunctive relief in Chalk, it is clear that
such relief should be available in any discriminatory discharge case involving AIDS
as long as: 1) the job involves no more than casual contact between the HIV infected
individual and others; 2) the discriminatee's physical and mental ability to work is not
seriously in doubt; and 3) there is no relevant significant change in epidemiology of
AIDS that would disturb the current weight of authority on the part of public health
officials concerning the issue of transmissibility of HIV.130
The availability of preliminary injunctive relief in a case involving refusal to hire
is more problematic. According to the Ninth Circuit panel in Chalk, "[t]he basic
function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a
determination of the action on the merits."' 13 1 When the complaint alleges an
unlawful discharge, the status quo is interpreted, as in Chalk, to be the continued
126. Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 188-89, 248-86 (Aug. 6, 1986) (Statement of Thomas B. Stoddard, Executive Director, Lambda Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc.).
127. Barbieri, Judge Grills Baker & McKenzie's Top Partner, I MANHATTAN LAw., May 10, 1988, at 1, 17. The
defendant, the New York office of the international law finn Baker & McKenzie, asserts that it was unaware that associate
attorney Geoffrey Bowers had AIDS when he was discharged, despite testimony by Division witnesses that Bowers had
visible Kaposi's sarcoma lesions prior to his discharge. Another case pending before an administrative judge of the New
York State Division on Human Rights shows that the Bowers case is not an isolated example; John Doe v. Westchester
County Medical Center, the case of an unsuccessful applicant for a pharmacist position, is in a hearing stage about two
years after filing of the initial complaint. See Gevisser, HIV Carriers Have Rights Too, 246 THE NATHIO,
May 21, 1988, at 710.
128. See supra note 74.
129. See supra note 27.
130. Chalk v. U.S. District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704-12 (9th Cir. 1988). This description of the scenario in which
preliminary injunctive relief would be available should not be construed to preclude such relief for all workers who could
hypothetically have blood contact with co-workers or members of the general public, but it seems likely that until there
is a body of such precedent, courts may be hesitant to award preliminary relief to such persons in the absence of strong
testimony from public health officials on the remoteness of the risk of transmission in such circumstances. A useful
analogy is provided by Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987), where the court
ordered reinstatement in the classroom of a youngster infected by HIV who had bitten another student, in light of
persuasive testimony that HIV is not transmitted through biting.
131. Chalk, 840 F.2d at 704.
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employment of the plaintiff, but when the complaint alleges refusal to hire, the notion
of status quo relief probably would not extend to an interim hiring order, especially
where there is some dispute as to the applicant's qualifications for the job unrelated
to the issue of handicap. Consequently, it is likely that those who encounter
discrimination in hiring will not be able to benefit from interim injunctive relief.
I. ALTERNATIVES TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION LAW
Employees who lose their jobs once they are physically or mentally unable to
work due to HIV related disorders may still have legal protections for some of the
incidents of employment-the insurance benefits necessary for their financial ability
to cope with AIDS. Rights to such benefits will in most cases be derived from the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),132 which is broadly pre-emptive
of state statutory and common law regulation of employee benefits issues. 133
However, if an employer's promise to provide such benefits is found not to amount
to an "employee benefit plan" as defined in ERISA,134 state contract law principles
may be relevant. In addition, since ERISA protections are limited, principles of state
contract law should be invoked to enforce the reasonable expectations of employees
that the benefits they have earned by their past labor are not suddenly unavailable
because of their medical emergency. Court intervention to enforce such expectations
would be consistent with the purposes and polices of ERISA.
A. Common Law Contractual Rights
Just as numerous courts have found that express employer policies regarding
disciplinary procedures and grounds for termination may rise to the level of
enforceable contractual rights, 3 5 courts should find that employees discharged due to
a disabling condition have contractual rights to employee benefits previously
promised by their employer as a term or condition of employment. Employers who
promise such benefits are making a unilateral offer for a contract which the employee
accepts by working after the offer is made.' 36 As such, the employee has earned the
benefit just as he or she has earned wages. When an employee is no longer able to
work due to disability, promises of employment related benefits would ripen into
entitlements as part of the consideration for past work performance. 137
These benefits can take a variety of forms, but the most valuable to disabled
employees will naturally include short and long term disability insurance, salary
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1145 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (3) (1982).
135. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REv. 631, 649-53 (1988).
136. Cf. Scoville v. Surface Transit, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 991, 242 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that
unilateral contract for pension benefits had been formed when employees worked for period of time stipulated in
employer's announced pension policy).
137. The Beauford court alluded to this possibility in noting that Ms. Beauford might pursue her claim to benefits
as a contract action in the Nebraska state courts. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 773 (8th Cir.
1987).
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continuation programs, and health and life insurance programs.1 38 As developed
more fully below, ERISA provides recourse only in limited circumstances for the loss
of these benefits due to termination of employment. A full discussion of ERISA
pre-emption of state law actions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, there
is authority upon which to build an argument that ERISA should not be interpreted
to pre-empt all attempts by employees to enforce contractual rights to benefits when
ERISA does not otherwise directly provide relief. 139
B. Statutory Rights to Benefits
Because of its pre-emptive effect, ERISA may supersede many contractual
claims in situations involving large employers. ERISA provides at least two vehicles
for disabled employees to claim continued entitlement to benefits: the continuation
coverage provisions, 40 and the nondiscrimination provisions.' 4'
1. Continuation Coverage
The continuation coverage provisions of ERISA were enacted in 1986 to address
the problem of employees losing group health insurance coverage for themselves and
their dependents upon loss of employment. 142 Employees who are beneficiaries under
employment related group health plans will qualify for continuation coverage if their
employer employs at least twenty persons. 143 If the employee's coverage under the
138. Once again, the Beauford case provides a useful catalog of benefits that a larger employer may afford to
employees. Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982), the ERISA pre-emption provision, has been a fertile source of litigation, due to its
sweeping language pre-empting "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in § 1003(a) of this title .... "Although it could be argued that a breach of contract action premised
on the failure to pay promised benefits theoretically "relatejs] to any employee benefit plan," there is authority for the
proposition that ERISA was not intended to preempt a breach of contract suit in all such circumstances. See Holliday v.
Xerox Corp., 555 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'don oiher grounds, 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 917 (1984); accord, Cattin v. General Motors Corp., 612 F. Supp. 948, 950 (E.D. Mich. 1985); see also Ex
parte Ward, 448 So.2d 349 (Ala. 1984) (claim for health insurance benefits in dispute over pre-existing condition clause
in plan). In Holliday, the federal trial court rejected a motion to dismiss a pendent contract claim with regard to an
employment-related benefit, stating:
[Tihe preemption problem is irrelevant to the existence of a valid contract because nothing in ERISA indicates
that Congress intended to make contracts unenforceable. Rather, if the state law is preempted, then the contract
must be construed in accordance with federal law, in this case the federal common law of contract. There is no
substantial body of federal common law of contract. Thus, state law will be looked to as a guide.
Holliday, 555 F.Supp. at 55.
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (Supp. IV 1986). For a more detailed consideration of the continuation coverage
provisions than what follows herein, see Cowley, Snakebite:A COBRA Warning, 66 TAxEs 315 (May 1988). Regulations
have not yet been adopted interpreting these provisions, and there is no reported case law.
141. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-41 (1982).
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 1163 (Supp. IV 1986), which describes "qualifying events" that will entitle an individual who
is a beneficiary under an employee benefit plan to apply for continuation coverage, pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 1161(a)
(Supp. IV 1986). The continuation coverage applies only to "group health plans," not to other employee welfare benefit
plans. Any termination of employment or reduction of hours which would result in loss of coverage under such a plan
would trigger continuation coverage rights, unless the termination is due to the employee's "gross misconduct." 29
U.S.C. § 1163(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b) (Supp. IV 1986) provides that "if all employers maintaining such plan [i.e., a group
health plan] normally employed fewer than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year"
the plan shall be exempt from continuation coverage requirements. Employees of smaller employers may find similar
coverage under state laws. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. L. § 3221 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1988) which provides for
continuation coverage on similar terms to those contained in the ERISA provisions.
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group health plan would otherwise cease because of a reduction in work hours as a
result of the employee's disability or because the employee has become entirely
unable to work, the employee is entitled to elect to continue to participate in the group
health plan for up to eighteen months, 44 or until he or she becomes covered under
another employer's plan through re-employment or becomes eligible for Medicare. 145
Employers may require their former employees to pay premiums for this coverage,
which may not exceed 102 percent of the normal charge for employee
participation. 146 If the employer's group health plan contains a conversion option for
individual coverage, former employees on continuation coverage must be afforded
the option. 147
Many persons affected by AIDS who lose their jobs, therefore, need not lose
their health insurance coverage. However, the requirement that the individual pay
premiums in order to maintain the coverage may present problems, depending upon
the former employee's access to funds for such purposes. 48 Maintaining insurance
coverage could also become difficult, especially if the former employee lost his or her
job not because of the inability to work, but rather because of discrimination
motivated by fear of AIDS. AIDS discriminatees are not prime candidates for rapid
re-employment, and may exhaust their eighteen months of continuation coverage as
well as unemployment insurance benefits without being able to obtain suitable
employment. Furthermore, if not actually disabled or diagnosed with AIDS, they will
not be eligible for Medicare coverage. The public welfare system may have to be their
last resort.
2. Nondiscrimination Requirements
ERISA section 510 states that employers cannot take adverse actions against
employees in order to deprive them of benefits to which they are or may become
entitled, and allows persons affected by such actions to bring a federal suit to
vindicate their rights. 149 Although section 510 was enacted primarily to prevent
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). If the employer terminates all group health insurance coverage for
his or her employees, those former employees on continuation coverage would also cease to be covered. 29 U.S.C. §
1162(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1986). Medicare eligibility for employees under retirement age begins two
years after the employee has become eligible for disability insurance under the Social Security system. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Of course, former employees who fail to pay the premiums will lose
their coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). The former employee is entitled to elect to pay premiums on
a monthly basis rather than in a lump sum. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(5) (Supp. IV 1986). Some states require that group health policies sold to employers include
conversion privileges. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. L. § 3221 (MeKinney 1985 & Supp. 1988).
148. Persons who live in states which have not followed the federal lead to provide continuation coverage rights for
those not covered by the federal law are distinctly disadvantaged in this regard. For those who do not have money to pay
for premiums for continuation coverage, state welfare benefits may be a source for premium payments until Medicare
eligibility finally occurs 24 months after the employee has become disabled or has been diagnosed with AIDS.
149. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). In pertinent part, section 1140 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan...., or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may
become entitled under the plan... The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the
enforcement of this section.
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employers from strategically timing employee discharges to prevent employees from
attaining rights under ERISA's vesting provisions, 50 it applies broadly to all
"employee benefit plans," including all forms of insurance benefits. 151 Although
most of the case law generated under section 510 pertains to pension issues,1 52 there
are a few cases which show how section 510 can be relevant to adverse actions
against employees affected by AIDS.153
The first and most celebrated section 510 employee welfare benefit case is Folz
v. Marriott Corporation.154 John R. Folz, the general manager of Marriott's hotel at
the Kansas City International Airport, was discharged during the spring of 1981 after
revealing to Marriott management officials that he had been diagnosed with multiple
sclerosis, a progressive disease of the nervous system.155 Prior to his diagnosis, Folz
had worked for Marriott in various capacities since 1965, and had been repeatedly
promoted, praised in work evaluations, and given raises and bonuses.156 Folz sued
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) creates a private right of action for participants or beneficiaries as follows,
in pertinent part:
A civil action may be brought-. .. (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan.
A similar action may be initiated by the Secretary of Labor upon request of a plan participant or beneficiary, see 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1132 (a)(5) and (b)(1)(B) (1982). In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982) forbids coercive actions by any person "for
the purpose of interfering with or preventing the exercise of any right to which [a plan beneficiary] is or may become
entitled under the plan. ... The circuit courts are split on whether individual employee actions must satisfy an
exhaustion requirement before suing to enforce statutory rights under section 510. Compare Mason v. Continental Group,
Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986) and Kross v. Vestem Electric Co., 701 F.2d
1238 (7th Cir. 1983) (both holding exhaustion is required) with Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.
1984) and Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986); accord, Gavalik v. Continental Can Co.,
812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.) (exhaustion not required), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 495 (1987).
I have briefly addressed ERISA issues in the context of AIDS discrimination previously, see AIDS and Employment
Law, supra note 15, at 24-25, 35-36. See also Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy
Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NoTRE DAstE L. REv. 1024 (1987). Professor Vogel argues
at length that section 510 should be seen as a nondiscrimination civil rights statute under which former employees are
entitled to relief if they can show that "interference with existing or future benefits rights was a substantial or motivating
factor behind the employer's employment decision." Id. at 1061. Accord, Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510-A Further
Limitation on Arbitrary Discharge, 10 IND. REL. L. J. 319 (1988).
150. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. ConE Co N. & AOMuN. NEws 4838, 4871-72.
151. Section 3 ofERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (3) (1982), defines "employee benefit plan" to include both
employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension benefit plans. "Employee welfare benefit plan" is defined in 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982) to include "any plan, fund, or program" established or maintained by an employer "for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds,
or prepaid legal services," as well as benefits described in the Labor Management Relations Act provisions governing
jointly administered union-management benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
152. Vogel, supra note 149, at 1025 n.6., collects decisions retrievable through published opinions or computer
databases through 1986. Research in subsequent decisions has revealed few pertaining to employee benefits other than
pensions.
153. In addition to the three cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 154-77, Bishop v. Osborn Transp., 838
F.2d 1173 (1 1th Cir. 1988) is noteworthy. The appellate decision deals solely with the question whether punitive damages
can be awarded for a purposeful violation of section 510. The trial court, in an unpublished opinion, found that the
employer had purposely altered an employee's date of discharge to interfere with the employee's attainment of medical
benefits under an ERISA covered plan. The Eleventh Circuit held that punitive damages were not available.
154. 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
155. Id. at 1010-12.
156. Id.
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Marriott under section 510, alleging that Marriott management had discharged him in
order to avoid liability under a variety of employee benefit programs.57
The court drew an inference of unlawful motivation from the timing of Folz's
discharge and from the manner in which the discharge was handled.1 58 Folz was
placed on "probation" despite the lack of objective dissatisfaction with his work, and
the probation was not handled consistently with Marriott's standard practices for
managers. In addition, because Marriott's benefit plans were self-funded, the court
found that there was a "substantial economic incentive" for Marriott to discharge
Folz.159 Having found that depriving Folz of benefits was a motivating factor in the
discharge, 160 the court considered Marriott's defense that the discharge was "for
cause," and found it wholly pretextual.' 6' Not only was Folz's past work record
exemplary, but during the final months of Folz's employment as general manager of
the Kansas City hotel, the hotel was upgraded to a four-diamond rating by the
American Automobile Association, the highest rating for hotel performance.1
62
Noting ERISA's broad authorization of equitable relief, the court performed
complex calculations to make Folz whole for lost salary, bonuses, benefits, stock
options, and pension rights.' 63 The court included in its calculations front-pay
through Folz's expected retirement date (he was 53 years old at the time of the court's
opinion, and the court assumed a normal retirement age of 65),164 and ordered
equitable relief with regard to pension and stock plan vesting. 65 The result in the case
was quite expensive for Marriott.' 66
Two subsequent opinions ruling on motions to dismiss similar claims have
reinforced the significance of Folz. In Zipf v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co.,167 Monica Zipf, an employee with more than fifteen years seniority, was
terminated for "excessive absenteeism" stemming from her rheumatoid arthritis.68
Under the company's disability benefits plan, Zipf would have been entitled to
disability benefits beginning on her eighth calendar day of absence from work. She
was discharged on the seventh day. Furthermore, as a senior employee, she would
have been entitled under company plans to extended disability benefits had she still
been employed on the eighth day of her absence. ' 69 The district court dismissed her
157. The court specified the following benefits programs relevant to the discharge decision: (I) medical benefits
plan, self-funded by Marriott; (2) sick leave plan, providing continued compensation for employees absent from work due
to illness; (3) long-term disability and salary continuation plan, also self-funded by Marriott; (4) pension and profit-sharing
plan, which provided full vesting after twenty years of employment, but as to which a plan amendment would go into
effect January 1, 1982, reducing full vesting time to 15 years; (5) deferred stock bonus plan. Id. at 1012-13.
158. Id. at 1014.
159. Id. at 1014-15.
160. Id. at 1015.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1011-12.
163. Id. at 1015-21.
164. Id. at 1018-19.
165. Id. at 1019-20.
166. As summarized by the court, the relief ordered included $88,677 in backpay, $85,443 in front pay, coverage
of past expenses due to lack of benefits coverage, prospective benefits entitlements of uncertain but possibly substantial
total value, and attorney's fees. Id. at 1021.
167. 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
168. Id. at 890.
169. Id.
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section 510 claim on an exhaustion theory. 170 The court of appeals overruled the
exhaustion holding and remanded for trial, 17' noting that Zipf had been told by her
immediate supervisor that the reason for her discharge had been to prevent her from
qualifying for disability benefits, and that certain memoranda written after the firing
to attempt to justify it on other grounds would be admissible and helpful to her
case. 172
In Bradley v. Capital Engineering & Manufacturing Co. ,173 Telitha Bradley, a
relatively new employee, was terminated just twelve days before she would have
qualified under the employer's medical benefit plan for coverage of a recently
discovered medical condition, diverticulitis. The plan provided that employees would
become fully covered three months after hiring, except for pre-existing conditions,
which would not be covered until after twelve months of service.174 Bradley, hired
in October 1985, incurred significant expenses due to hospitalization for treatment of
diverticulitis in July 1986. She claimed the condition was newly discovered by her
doctor at that time, more than three months after her hiring, but the company claimed
that diverticulitis requiring hospitalization must have been a pre-existing condition,
and refused payment. Bradley was subsequently discharged shortly before she would
qualify for coverage of pre-existing conditions under the company's plan. 175
The court rejected the company's pre-existing condition defense, ordering
payment for the medical expenses Bradley had incurred during the summer of
1986.176 In addition, the court refused to dismiss the wrongful termination claim
despite the company's allegation that Bradley was laid off as part of a general
reduction in force that affected more than twenty percent of its employees at the same
time. 177
Taken together, these cases show that section 510 can be a powerful tool to
combat AIDS related discrimination against employees. 178 In particular, any em-
ployer who initiates a mandatory "AIDS testing" program for current employees
would immediately be suspected of plotting to avoid AIDS related benefit costs.179
170. The trial court ruled that Zipf should have filed a claim for benefits under the plan before suing in federal court.
Id. at 890, 891.
171. The Third Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in holding that exhaustion of plan remedies is not required when the
employee is suing primarily to assert a statutory right arising under section 510. Id. at 891-94.
172. Id. at 894-95.
173. 678 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
174. Id. at 1332.
175. Id. The opinion of the court responds to motions for summary judgement by Bradley and motions to dismiss
by the company. Bradley pled in two counts: for reimbursement of her medical expenses and for termination in violation
of section 510 of ERISA. Id. at 1331-32.
176. Id. at 1333-34. The court denied Bradley's request for punitive damages, but awarded "reasonable attorney's
fees." Id. at 1334-35.
177. Id. at 1336-37. The court noted that "plaintiff, at a later stage in this litigation, may incur difficulty
substantiating her hypothetical sequence of events demonstrating that defendant's decision to discharge her was motivated
by consideration of her benefits rather than a general economic cutback scheme." Id.
178. For obvious reasons, section 510 provides no relief to job applicants, since its protections only extend to
participants in employee benefit plans, not potential participants.
179. See, e.g., Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 495 (1987). The
Third Circuit held that a company program to systematically cut retirement benefit costs by placing employees on layoff
to avoid vesting events, including shifting production between plants in order to minimize vesting liabilities, violated
section 510. By analogy, any systematic employer policy undertaken primarily to prevent employees from obtaining
benefits to which they would become entitled in the normal course of employment, could violate section 510.
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Because of the nature of HIV infection, ARC, and AIDS, employees who encounter
adverse treatment would normally be able to work. Therefore, explanations for the
adverse treatment (other than explanations based on fear of coworker or customer
reactions) 180 would usually be pretextual.
Furthermore, because of the broad equitable power given to federal courts to
prevent violations of ERISA,' 8 t and the forward looking language of section 510
itself, 18 2 preliminary injunctive relief should be available in a section 510 lawsuit to
prevent irreparable injury to the employee. 183
C. Collective Bargaining Agreements
For employees who are represented by labor unions, collective bargaining
agreements can provide significant help in combating AIDS related job difficulties.
The normal method of resolving difficulties in a unionized workplace is through a
contractual grievance procedure terminating in binding arbitration by a neutral person
selected by the parties. There have been only a handful of reported arbitration
decisions involving employees with AIDS, but the reported decisions all indicate that
arbitrators will strain to be protective of the rights of an employee affected by a
serious disease such as AIDS.184
The most recent reported decision, Local 517-S, Production, Services and Sales
District Council v. The Bucklers, Inc.,t85 concerned a flexible machine operator who
had been employed for eight years by a picture-frame manufacturer.186 The employee
complained of feeling ill and asked for a transfer from his job, presenting a note from
his doctor indicating that he could "perform any type of job, except those requiring
lifting or prolonged standing." His job required occasional lifting and prolonged
standing. During the ensuing discussion between management and union represen-
tatives, the employee was advised to file for disability benefits. The parties later
disagreed as to whether termination of employment was also discussed. About two
weeks later, the employee returned to the plant with an informally phrased,
handwritten doctor's note indicating he could return to work with no activity
restriction, which the company rejected as suspicious. 187 A week after that, the
180. In almost all situations, these defenses should be rejected for the same reasons they are rejected under Title VII
and handicap discrimination laws. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 15, at 696-702.
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982) speaks of prohibiting not only retaliation against employees for their past assertion
of rights under benefit plans, but also prohibits discrimination against employees to interfere with the attainment of a right
to which the employee "may become entitled" in the future.
183. Such preliminary relief should be available consistent with the ruling in Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1988), since all the tests for such equitable relief would presumably be the same under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and section 510 of ERISA.
184. The earliest significant arbitration decision involving an employee with AIDS was never officially reported.
Arbitrator Martin Wagner ordered United Air Lines to offer reinstatement to a flight attendant with AIDS who had not
been certified by a doctor as unable to perform his normal duties. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 15, at 688
n.32.
185. 90 Lab. Arb. 937 (BNA) (1987) (Braufman, Arb.).
186. Id.
187. As characterized by the arbitrator.
On or about June 9, according to Mr. [A], the grievant presented to Mr. [F], president of the company, a
handwritten note from the union's Medical Center, signed by a Dr. [G], stating: "Mr. [C] may return to work.
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employee presented a typewritten note from a different doctor, indicating that he had
been diagnosed with AIDS but making no comment about his ability to work. The
employee grieved to be returned to work.188
The arbitrator held that the company was at fault for not "making an effort to
ascertain the validity" of the handwritten note it had cursorily rejected, and for
apparently terminating the employee in the absence of any direct medical evidence as
to his ability to work. 189 The arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated to an unpaid
disability leave, and ordered the company and the union mutually to select an "AIDS
specialist" to examine the employee and determine whether he was physically able
to perform his old job as a Flexible Machine Operator. Actual reinstatement to work
would only be ordered if the specialist certified the employee as able to perform the
full range of work required by the job. 190
Significantly, the arbitrator did not order the company to find a different job for
the employee to perform, or to modify his job duties so that he could perform his old
job. The arbitrator made no mention of handicap discrimination law in explaining his
decision. The result in the case was similar to a previously published decision which
had ordered reinstatement of an employee with AIDS to a disability leave status at a
nursing home. 191
The decision in Local 517-S shows advantages and drawbacks of arbitration as
compared to handicap discrimination law in resolving AIDS related employment
disputes. One of the main advantages is timeliness; the termination occurred on May
He has no activity restriction." This note obviously being presented to help get the grievant's job back.... Mr.
[A] testified to the effect that the note's informal appearance, as well as its content, raised a serious question
as to authenticity; for which reason Mr. [F] decided to disregard it, and made no attempt at verification.
Id. at 938.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 939. The arbitrator characterized the "termination" of the employee as "untimely and improper," but
stated that he did "not possess any authoritative information... on which a proper reinstatement order could be issued."
Id.
190. Id. The arbitrator concluded:
Whether the grievant suffers from some form of AIDS or from some other disease or illness, should be
immaterial so far as his employment status is concerned. What is really crucial, in my view, is whether or not,
despite his health problem, the grievant is truly capable of doing his job. If he is, then he should be permitted
to return to work promptly provided of course, that such return poses no additional health threat either to the
grievant or to his co-workers.
Id. The arbitrator's award specified that the AIDS specialist appointed to examine the employee should be "apprised by
the parties of the regular duties of a Flexible Machine Operator before he examines the grievant; and, if he certifies him,
in writing, to be fit to perform the full range of those duties without jeopardy to himself or his co-workers, then the
grievant shall be permitted to resume active duty at the start of the work week next following issuance of the specialist's
report .. " Id.
191. Nursing Home, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681 (1987) (Sedwick, Arb.). The only other reported arbitration decision
involving employment rights of persons with AIDS held that a school board had violated its duty to bargain with the union
representing teachers when it unilaterally adopted a policy of excluding teachers with AIDS from the classroom. Cook
County Bd. of Educ., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1987) (Witney, Arb.). Two other published arbitration decisions
concerned problems with prison guards. In one, the arbitrator ordered reinstatement of a guard who had refused to perform
"pat searches" of prisoners without wearing gloves; the arbitrator held that the warden had overreacted and should have
addressed the guard's fears through education rather than discipline. Minnesota Dep't of Correct., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1185 (1985) (Gallagher, Arb.). In the other, the arbitrator ordered the prison to have prisoners tested for HIV infection
and report the names of those who tested positive to the guards' union; prisoners had received anonymous testing and the
results were withheld from guards, who were frightened because a prisoner had died from AIDS. The arbitrator gave a
literal reading to collective agreement language by which the guards were entitled to know about the presence of prisoners
harboring contagious conditions. Delaware Dep't of Correct., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 849 (1986) (Gill, Arb.).
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22, 1987, and the arbitration award was rendered November 18, 1987.192 Few other
forums can provide such expeditious handling of a litigated case where time is
crucial. 193 More significantly, however, few other forums can provide the degree of
flexibility accorded a labor arbitrator in interpreting a labor agreement and fashioning
an award, since there is little notion of binding precedent in labor arbitration.
On the other hand, a grievant in arbitration may lose some of the benefits
available under handicap discrimination law, especially the affirmative requirement
of reasonable accommodation. In Local 517-S, the arbitrator's award restricts the
right of reinstatement to the employee's former job if the employee is found cap-
able of performing all prior job duties, without considering how the company might
take steps to accommodate the employee through minor changes in the job or a
transfer. Under handicap discrimination laws, the requirement of reasonable accom-
modation might be interpreted by a court to require such efforts by the company. 194
However, there is nothing to preclude an arbitrator from taking the same approach as
handicap discrimination law and imposing some accommodation requirement upon
the employer. Consequently, advocates representing employees with AIDS in
arbitration should consider presenting the full range of handicap discrimination law
arguments to arbitrators.
III. AIDS AND HIRING DECISIONS
Employers may believe that they have good reasons to avoid hiring persons who
might be at risk of developing AIDS. Whether the employer is self-insured for health
benefits or purchases health insurance, the employer is sure to feel economic
consequences from the costs of treatments associated with AIDS. If an employee
develops symptoms of ARC or AIDS, accommodation measures are likely to
generate some expense. Employees suffering from debilitating and possibly disabling
conditions may have a negative impact on workplace morale. The subject of AIDS
may arouse fears in other workers. Employers may also fear that their businesses will
suffer if word gets out that they employ persons infected with HIV or suffering from
ARC or AIDS. 195 AIDS forces upon the workplace the unpleasant subjects of disease
and death, which may increase workplace stress. Finally, AIDS will present problems
for management, including extra burdens placed on managers to deal effectively with
the issues it raises.
192. Local 517-S, 90 Lab. Ar. at 937.
193. The major exception, of course, is a court entertaining a petition for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief,
as in the Chalk case, where the employee with AIDS received the court's mandate to return to work in a matter of a few
months (including an appeal of an initially negative decision from the trial judge). Of course, there is nothing to preclude
a union from applying to an arbitrator for similar interim relief.
194. Under the facts of the case, the employee might be able to do his job if given an adjustable stool or chair to
relieve him from standing throughout the shift, and if given occasional assistance when required to lift a frame. Local
517-S, 90 Lab. Arb. at 937.
195. One dramatic example of AIDS fears at work is illustrated by Stepp v. Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 521 N.E.2d
350 (Ind. App. 1988), in which the Employment Security Division was affirmed in its decision that a laboratory technician
was dismissed for cause when she refused to perform certain job tasks involving processing AIDS blood samples due to
irrational fears of transmission. Another dramatic example is Cronan v. New England Tel., supra note 75, where
coworker fears resulted in the constructive discharge of an employee with ARC.
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Consequently, it is likely that persons infected with HIV or suffering from ARC
or AIDS will face significant difficulty in finding employment if their condition is
known to potential employers. It is also likely that many employers will be motivated
to use hiring criteria which seek to identify persons who may be at risk of developing
AIDS. The two methods most likely to be used are: discrimination on the basis of
personal characteristics associated with AIDS, or attempts to require applicants to be
tested for HIV antibodies. The former method is probably unlawful with respect to at
least some of the relevant characteristics in many jurisdictions; the latter method is
expressly unlawful in a few states and arguably unlawful under handicap discrimi-
nation laws in most jurisdictions.
A. Screening Applicants for "Lifestyle" Traits
To date, AIDS is associated in the public mind with homosexual men and IV
drug abusers.196 Employers seeking to avoid the complications of AIDS in their
workplaces may try to determine the sexual orientation and recreational drug use
practices of job applicants in an effort to avoid hiring those people likely to have
engaged in behaviors associated with HIV transmission.
Employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is unlawful by
local ordinance in many cities and counties in which there are significant numbers of
AIDS cases. 197 Such discrimination is also unlawful in Wisconsin 98 and possibly
California' 99 by virtue of state law. There is some authority that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation by public employers will be considered unconstitutional in
many instances.20o
However, all attempts to include sexual orientation discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act have been unsuccessful due to a narrow view by the
196. The classification of recent immigrants from Haiti as a separate "risk group" early in the epidemic produced
significant discrimination in employment against persons in that group. The particular Haitian connection seems to have
faded as the epidemic expanded in scope. Increasing publicity for the statistics that AIDS is disproportionately affecting
blacks and Hispanics may, however, result in increased discriminatory attitudes towards those individuals when they look
for work.
197. There is presently no published source presenting a complete list of such jurisdictions, although at the time of
writing the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund was compiling a publication which will reproduce in full text the
antidiscrimination statutes and ordinances known to exist. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force was preparing a new
edition of a checklist of such jurisdictions first published several years ago. According to an article in The Washington
Blade on May 27, 1988, reporting the passage of a nondiscrimination ordinance in Baltimore, Maryland, "Baltimore had
been one of the few remaining major cities on the East Coast not providing some sort of protection for Lesbians and Gay
men. The District [of Columbia], Boston, New York, Buffalo, Philadelphia, and Atlanta have passed similar legislation."
Parker, Civil Rights Focus Fuels Baltimore Bill's Victory, The Vashington Blade, May 27, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Another
source lists 61 U.S. cities and counties that have some form of gay rights ordinance, but not all such ordinances cover
private sector employment, and the list is not documented in any way. L. RutmoE, Tim GAY BOOK oF Ltsrs 151-53
(1987). A brief and incomplete list of such jurisdictions is given in LARSON, 3 E.pLomyriEr DtscRsmuNAloN § 110.30
(198898. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-111.395 (West 1988).
199. 69 Op. Att'y Gen. Cal. 80 (1986).
200. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (sexual orientation is a suspect classification for
purposes of fifth amendment equal protection challenge to military regulations barring enlistment of gays) reh'g en banc
ordered, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988); High Tech Gays v. DISCO, 668 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (special
procedures for investigating security clearances of gay applicants violate equal protection rights; sexual orientation is at
least a quasi-suspect classification); but see Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (classifications based on
sexual orientation not subject to heightened scrutiny, since conduct "defining" classification is not constitutionally
protected).
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federal courts of what constitutes sex discrimination, 20' and no proposal to add the
phrase "sexual orientation" at appropriate points in Title VII has gotten as far as a
floor vote in either house of Congress. Thus, a large portion of the population lives
in jurisdictions where such discrimination remains lawful and may not be subject to
legal challenge. 20 2 Furthermore, temporary injunctive relief is probably not available
in connection with a complaint of unlawful refusal to hire. Therefore, the efficacy of
such laws in securing actual employment for individuals (as opposed to compensation
for the unlawful refusal to hire) is limited, given the delays which normally
accompany civil rights litigation.
Refusals to hire current drug users present a difficult problem of interpretation
under handicap discrimination laws. The Rehabilitation Act treats drug addiction as
a handicapping condition, but makes a large exception to the law's protection for a
drug abuser "whose current use.., prevents such individual from performing the
duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current...
drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others." 20 3
Consequently, employers who sought to exclude IV drug users from their workplaces
could do so if they could show that current drug abuse would present a threat to
property or safety, not an insurmountable task with regard to a wide variety of
occupations. The protections of the Act have proven more useful to former addicts
who have been rehabilitated because the Act also protects those with a record of an
impairment and the exclusionary language with regard to drug abuse only applies to
current abusers, not former abusers. 2° 4 Because of the significant time which may
exist between infection and development of ARC or AIDS, employers might be
tempted to avoid hiring former as well as present drug abusers, but the Act's
protection should be available for the reformed abusers. 205
B. Screening Applicants for HIV Infection
The use of current antibody tests to screen job applicants for AIDS has been
thoroughly addressed by the leading authority on medical screening of workers,
Professor Mark Rothstein. 206 In essence, Professor Rothstein contends that such
testing would violate handicap discrimination laws in most instances, given the
current understanding of HIV transmission and the various workplace risks flowing
from that understanding, because testing would readily lend itself to employment
201. E.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) T" 6495 (1976).
202. Employers who try to avoid hiring gay men covertly by routinely refusing to hire single men may, however,
run afoul of almost universal federal and state law bans on discrimination on the basis of sex, as well as the laws which
forbid discrimination on the basis of marital status in many jurisdictions. E.g., N.Y. Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 1982).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 706(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
204. Id.
205. Some state handicap discrimination laws provide similar protections for current or former drug abusers.
206. Rothstein, Screening Workersfor AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAw: A GUImE rOR THE PUBLIC 126 (H. Dalton & S.
Burnis eds. 1987) [hereinafter Rothstein I]; see also Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers: Genetics, AIDS and
Beyond, 2 LAB. Law 675 (Fall 1986) [hereinafter Rothstein II]. For an excellent recent description of available HIV
antibody test technology, see Thomas, The Perils of AIDS Testing, I 1 Los ANGELF-S LAw. No. 6, at 39-46 (Oct. 1988).
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decisions which violate the handicap discrimination laws. 20 7 In addition, as previ-
ously noted, a few jurisdictions have passed laws which expressly forbid such testing
for employment purposes. 208 Finally, testing generates records of infection which
could create employer liability if not treated with adequate respect for
confidentiality. 209
A new development which postdates Professor Rothstein's treatment of the issue
is the decision in Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation,2t0
holding unconstitutional a mandatory HIV antibody testing program for employees of
a state agency providing services to the mentally retarded. Chief Judge Strom of the
Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska concluded that such a testing
program would implicate serious fourth amendment questions involving personal
privacy. Relying on Schmerber v. California2tt for the proposition that individuals
"have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal information their body
fluids contain," '2 12 the court applied a balancing test, weighing the employees'
"reasonable expectations of privacy" as against the employer's "interest in a safe
training and living environment for all developmentally disabled persons receiving
services from the agency.''213 Since all pertinent medical evidence indicated that
there is no necessity to exclude infected persons from employment in the agency to
satisfy the employer's interest, the court determined that the testing policy marked an
unreasonable intrusion into the privacy rights of the employees. 214
Glover is especially important because all past challenges to government "AIDS
testing" programs for applicants and employees have failed. 215 The Glover opinion
makes clear that attempts to justify "AIDS testing" for applicants or employees by
arguments based on public health concerns will receive careful scrutiny from the
207. Rothstein I, supra note 206, at 128-29, 135-39. Professor Rothstein additionally stresses the accuracy
problems of currently available tests for HIV screening by employers, as well as the uncertainty of the meaning of test
results. Id. at 129-34. It is likely that advancing technology in testing and increasing knowledge of the natural history
of HIV infection will decrease the salience of this portion of his analysis of the issue, particularly if tests suitable for
large-scale screening are licensed which can directly detect HIV infection as opposed to detecting antibody formation.
The writer of this article has also previously commented on the testing question. See AIDS and Employment Law,
supra note 15, at 42-50; Handicapping Condition, supra note 15, at § 12.04.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 79-89.
209. AIDS and Employment Law, supra note 15, at 49-50.
210. 686 F.Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988).
211. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
212. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 250.
213. Id.
214. Id. Curiously, the opinion does not mention the Rehabilitation Act at all. Presumably, a state mental retardation
agency would receive some form of federal funding, if only social welfare payments under Medicare for some of its
clients, thus subjecting its policies to section 504 nondiscrimination requirements, but the court does not address the issue.
215. In Local 1812, Am. Fed. ofGov't Employees v. U.S. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987), the court
held that the unusual circumstances presented by overseas employment in the foreign service made it reasonable, and thus
constitutional, for the State Department to test applicants and current foreign service employees and their dependents for
HIV infection and to exclude not only those who tested positive but also those whose dependents who would accompany
them to overseas postings had tested positive. Id. at 53. A significant distinction between Local 1812 and Glover is the
articulated reason for the testing: in Local 1812, the court found that the reason for the program was ascertaining "fitness
for duty," as opposed to "stopping the spread of HIV infection." Id. In Glover, the purpose was the latter. Glover, 686
F. Supp. at 247.
Challenges to the military testing programs have failed for similar reasons. Batten v. Lehman, No. CA 85-4108
(D.D.C., Jan. 18, 1986), see I AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 1, at 3 (Jan. 29, 1986) (upholding discharges of Naval
personnel who tested positive).
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federal courts when public sector jobs are involved. While constitutional privacy
interests do not apply in the private sector, the Glover opinion may at least provide
a model for private sector decision makers who wish to acknowledge the civil rights
of individuals in the private workplace, and certainly for legislators considering
whether to ban HIV antibody testing by employers.
C. Affirmative Assistance for Seropositive Jobseekers
Sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act 216 require federal government
agencies and federal contractors to undertake affirmative action to employ qualified
handicapped individuals. 217 State and local statutes and ordinances in many jurisdic-
tions impose similar affirmative action obligations. It would be most appropriate, in
light of the special problems people affected by AIDS encounter in obtaining em-
ployment, for government agencies and contractors to contact AIDS service organi-
zations for referrals of qualified clients who need employment and are able to work.
While a refusal by a federal contractor to hire or continue to employ a particular person
with AIDS may not by itself constitute a violation of the statutory affirmative action
obligation, 2 18 a systematic refusal by agencies or contractors to entertain employment
applications from persons affected by AIDS would clearly be unlawful. 219
IV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES WITH AIDS
As new medications make it possible for persons with AIDS to continue working
for longer periods of time, the issue of their entitlement to continued benefits will
assume even greater importance. AIDS is an expensive condition. A recent review by
Daniel M. Fox and Emily H. Thomas of various studies of AIDS medical costs
concluded that "[t]he lifetime cost of medical care for persons with AIDS is
comparable to the more expensive other acute illnesses.' 220 AIDS presents a special
challenge to employee benefit plan funding assumptions because the expenses occur
among a population which was not predicted to experience such costs when funding
216. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (1982).
217. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1-60-1.47, 60-741.1-60-741.30 (1987) (describing affirmative action obligations of
contractors and subcontractors for handicapped workers).
218. Or so the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs apparently found in the case of John Chadbourne,
Raytheon v. Fair Empl. and Housing Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1097 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1988).
219. While systematic refusal to hire a particular group of handicapped individuals may run afoul of the affirmative
action requirements of section 503, it may be difficult for an individual discriminatee to secure relief. Because there is
no private right of action under section 503 (see Hodges v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984)), the discriminatee's sole remedy is to complain to the Labor Department's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, which is not noted for aggressive enforcement of nondiscrimination requirements. The
Watkins draft report to the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic recommends strengthening of the federal
antidiscrimination enforcement effort under existing limited laws, such as sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
pending passage of comprehensive private sector antidiscrimination coverage at the federal level. See Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 107, at D-I (June 3, 1988).
220. Fox & Thomas, AIDS Cost Analysis and Social Policy, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 186, 195 (Winter
1987/88). Table 7 of the appendix to the Fox & Thomas article showed a $50,000 lifetime hospital cost for AIDS
compared to $158,000 for end-stage kidney disease patients on dialysis, $68,700 for paraplegia from an auto crash,
S66,800 for myocardial infarction in men of middle age, $47,500 for cancer of the digestive system in men of middle age,
and $28,600 for leukemia in men of middle age. The last year of life for cancer patients was shown to generate an average
cost of $30,300, compared to final year hospital costs in AIDS of roughly $20-25,000. Id. Table 7, at 206.
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mechanisms were designed before the advent of AIDS. Consequently, insurance
premiums or self-insurance expense forecasts were made without providing for
AIDS, and insurers and companies are being called upon to assume costs for which
they had not planned.
While most insurance companies and self-insurers seem to have paid benefits
without protest during the early years of the epidemic, the mounting caseload has
provided incentives for future cost avoidance. Some insurance companies are trying
to issue new group policies with exclusions or caps for AIDS related benefits, and
some self-insured companies are also attempting to exclude or limit AIDS related
expenses from coverage. 22'
The most dramatic example of this phenomenon was reported in national media
during August 1988. The Wall Street Journal reported on August 5 that Circle K
Corporation, described as the nation's second largest convenient store chain, had sent
a letter to employees dated January 1, 1988 announcing a new policy of terminating
medical coverage of employees who became sick or injured as a result of AIDS,
alcohol, drug abuse, or self-inflicted wounds.22 2 Circle K, which is self-insured,
defended its policy as necessary to protect the benefits of other employees. The
company maintained that it would be unfair for those other employees to subsidize
employees whose medical expenses were due to their "life-styles. ' 2 2 3 The glare of
media attention and criticism led Circle K to quickly rescind its policy,224 but the
issue is sure to recur.
Whether employer exclusions or restrictions on AIDS coverage can successfully
be subjected to legal challenge depends upon the nature of the employer's benefit
plans and the sources of the employer's income. As to the latter, if the employer
derives income from federal grants or contracts, AIDS restrictive programs might be
subject to challenge under the Rehabilitation Act. 225 If the employer provides health
benefits by purchasing insurance for employees, state insurance laws and regulations
may be applicable. If the employer is self-insured, ERISA pre-emption 226 divests
state and local governments from regulating the provision of benefits, except to the
extent such regulations merely enforce the requirements of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.227
221. In addition to the Circle K benefits policy, discussed below, an administrative complaint was filed early in 1988
by National Gay Rights Advocates against a Florida real estate developer which changed insurance plans when an
employee contracted AIDS so as to put a low lifetime cap on AIDS related benefits. See Complaint Charges Employer
in Health Plan Adoption, 3 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 4, at 4-5 (Mar. 9, 1988).
222. Noble, Health Insurance Tied to Life Style, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
223. Id.; Kramon, Business and Health: Curbing Costs of 'Life Style' Ills, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at D2, col.
I. Kramon's article points out that Circle K's "lifestyle" policy was curiously selective, since smoking is a lifestyle
choice that generates significant employee health benefit expenses but was not mentioned in the list of causes for exclusion
from benefits.
224. Noble, Company Suspends Insurance Cut-Off, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1988, at AS, col. I; Circle K Drops
Proposal To Limit Health Benefits, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1988).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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Taking first the issue of federal handicap discrimination law, it is logical to
assume that if refusals to hire or continue to employ individuals because of their
affliction with AIDS violate handicap discrimination law,22 8 differential treatment of
employees under benefit plans because of the nature of their handicapping condition
(i.e., AIDS) would likewise violate the law. If an employer responds that the
differential treatment has a bona fide economic justification due to the expense of
AIDS, it should be sufficient to rebut that argument by showing studies, such as the
Fox and Thomas study,229 which conclude that AIDS treatment falls in the expense
range of other serious illnesses normally covered by employee benefit plans.
Consequently, employers subject to the requirements of the Act would probably be
subjecting themselves to liability under the Act if they failed to provide medical
benefits to employees with AIDS on the same basis as benefits are provided to
employees with other illnesses. 230
Employers who are not subject to the Act may still be subject to nondiscrimi-
nation requirements imposed by state and local handicap discrimination ordinances,
but those requirements probably would not be enforceable with respect to employee
benefit plans because of ERISA pre-emption. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ,231 the
Supreme Court ruled that a New York sex discrimination law which had been
construed by that state's highest court to forbid denial of health benefits on account
of pregnancy 2 32 was pre-empted by ERISA. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun
noted that ERISA broadly pre-empted all state laws that "relate to any employee
benefit plan," the only exceptions being laws regulating insurance, banking or
securities, or state criminal laws.2 33
However, Justice Blackmun also noted that ERISA's pre-emption provision
expressly does not "alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
of the United States. . .. ,,234 Title VII continues to apply to employee benefit plans
in pari materia with ERISA. Since Title VII enforcement provisions include a
procedure for deferring cases to state agencies with authorizing statutes similar to
Title VII,235 state employment discrimination laws would not be pre-empted by
ERISA to the extent they covered the same practices forbidden by Title VII.236
228. See supra text accompanying notes 16-131.
229. See supra note 220.
230. In this regard, the Rehabilitation Act requirements would be analogous to those imposed by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), which requires employers to cover pregnancy on the same
basis as other disabilities under employee benefit programs.
231. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
232. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393
(1976).
233. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
234. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)).
235. Id. at 100-02. In particular, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and (c) (1982).
236. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102-04. This narrowing construction of ERISA pre-emption did not save the New York law
in Shaw, however, because that case dealt with discrimination determinations made prior to the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). At that time, refusals by employers
to cover pregnancy under their employee benefit plans were not considered unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII,
as construed by the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Consequently, due to ERISA
pre-emption of state law, New York could not require employers to cover pregnancy until such coverage was required
under Title VII on the same basis as coverage of other disabilities. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 104-06.
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Consequently, if AIDS exclusionary practices under employee benefit plans could be
shown to discriminate unlawfully under Title VII, both the Federal Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission and state and local fair employment practices
commissions would have jurisdiction to deal with the ensuing complaints.
The characteristics of persons with AIDS are such that Title VII disparate impact
arguments can be made. AIDS, particularly in large urban areas, disparately affects
persons of color and Hispanic Americans, and in the United States, persons with
AIDS are overwhelmingly male. Any employer policy which seeks to limit or
exclude coverage for AIDS related conditions would thus have the effect of
disparately disadvantaging male and minority employees, bringing into play Title VII
and state and local prohibitions against discrimination in terms and conditions of
employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, and sex.237
At least one administrative decision has been reported embracing this theory of
liability. The Oregon Civil Rights Division ruled on January 9, 1988 that an
employer's exclusion of AIDS coverage unlawfully discriminated against male
employees. 238 The employer was self-insured and not subject to the Rehabilitation
Act's provisions. The Division reasoned that "because more than 90 percent of those
infected with AIDS are males (in Oregon and nationally) leads this agency to find that
respondent's exclusion of AIDS disparately impacts males in denying employees an
employment benefit.'' 239 The ruling came after initial investigation, and was not a
final appealable ruling, so it may be some time before a judicial determination can be
obtained.
The Oregon decision seems conceptually sound, if not phrased with particular
felicity. There are many medical conditions that are endemic to particular sexual or
racial groups, and general health insurance programs which selectively exclude
particular illnesses normally identified with particular groups are clearly discrimina-
tory. Unfortunately, the lack of express federal protection against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation leaves unprotected the largest single population group
identified with AIDS, gay men, and it may be that some administrators and judges
may accept the defense argument which the Oregon commission rejected: that the
employer's policy did not disparately impact men as such, but rather impacted a
subgroup of men defined by certain risk behaviors. This argument is closely
237. When a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant has the burden of showing
that the criterion or policy which has that impact is job-related. See generally New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(cases establishing disparate impact theory under Title VII and setting forth rebuttal burdens of employers). It would seem
difficult for employers to establish that the exclusion of coverage for AIDS under their employee benefit plans bears any
particular relationship to necessary job functions, but care must be taken in laying the foundation for a disparate impact
case. In Beazer, the Court established a stiff requirement for statistical evidence adequate to make out a prima faie case
of disparate impact; statistics must show that a particular policy has a disparate impact in the employer's own workforee,
not just in the "general population." See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584-87. See generally, Note, supra note 59.
238. See Exclusion ofInsurance Held to Discriminate Against Men, 3 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 2, at 5-6 (Feb.
10, 1988). The case, in which the respondent was M.F. Salta Co., Inc. and affiliates, which operates a Nissan dealership
in Beaverton, Oregon, is identified as Oregon Civil Rights Division, Bureau of Labor, Case EM-HP-870108-1353.
239. Id. at 6.
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analogous to the argument by which the Supreme Court initially ruled that exclusion
of pregnancy disability benefits did not constitute unlawful sex discrimination. 240
If policy makers want to ensure that employee benefit plans pick up a fair share
of the costs of AIDS when they fall upon persons who are employed, they will have
to take steps either to extend Title VII protection to disabled persons, or enact specific
federal legislation forbidding exclusion or excessively low capping of AIDS related
benefits so as to avoid the problems created by ERISA pre-emption.
Employers who provide medical benefits to their employees by the purchase of
insurance policies are in a different legal situation altogether. ERISA specifically
does not pre-empt state and local laws which regulate the sale and marketing of
insurance, so actions by state insurance commissioners may proceed upon charges of
improper exclusion of benefits for AIDS. In New York, for example, in addition to
statutory provisions forbidding discrimination by insurers on the basis of race, color,
creed, and national origin,24t or sex and marital status, 242 regulations prescribing the
minimum required coverage under health insurance policies forbid the exclusion of
particular diseases, presumably under the theory that exclusions of particular diseases
would undermine the very purpose of having general health insurance policies.2 43
The issue of employee benefits and AIDS raises once again the question whether
a modern industrial society, such as the United States, can continue to function
without some form of national health insurance structure going beyond care for the
indigent. Employers understandably seek to avoid having to pay the bill for expensive
illnesses which are not occupationally related, and a national health insurance scheme
would undoubtedly be more efficient than an employee benefits scheme as a
mechanism for spreading AIDS related medical costs over the largest population
base. However, as long as Congress remains resistant to enacting such a scheme, the
burden will have to fall on employment related benefits programs, and gaps in the
legal framework for ensuring equitable treatment of employees covered by such plans
will have to be addressed.
V. CONCLUSION
The workplace has played a central role in the developing law surrounding
AIDS. The initial legal developments have concerned the rights of workers affected
by AIDS to continue working, but as the epidemic expands and evolves additional
issues will naturally arise. These additional issues will include the rights of workers
to continue to benefit from employment related programs such as disability insurance,
salary continuation, and health insurance. Also included will be the rights of
unemployed persons to receive fair consideration of their employment applications
240. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
241. N.Y. INS. LA\v § 2606 (McKinney 1985).
242. Id. at § 2607.
243. See 11 N.Y. Co.sip. CODEs R. & REGs. § 52.16(c) (McKinney 1985), which provides, inter alia, "No policy
shall limit or exclude coverage by type of illness, accident, treatment or medical condition. . ." with certain exceptions
not relevant to the issue of AIDS exclusions.
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when they are infected by HIV or actually diagnosed with ARC or AIDS, or are
perceived to be persons at risk for AIDS.
Existing laws should play an important role in accommodating the needs of these
people, but the laws can only be effective if those charged with administering them
are given the necessary support to do an effective job. Civil rights agencies,
notoriously underfunded and understaffed, must take on significant new burdens,
including prompt applications for temporary injunctive relief in cases which cannot
be settled, if the statutory protections for people with AIDS are to be more than
merely symbolic.
It is in the interest of society to interpret and apply employment laws relevant to
the AIDS situation in a liberal spirit because nobody benefits if the hundreds of
thousands (perhaps even millions) of persons affected by HIV or AIDS become an
unemployable class, deprived of the economic and social support systems of the
workplace. Public health needs provide no justification for excluding persons infected
by HIV from the workplace. Also, the latent homophobia and racism which
contribute to discrimination against persons affected by AIDS should not be allowed
to detract from rational public policy in the face of this epidemic. 244
244. The draft report of Admiral Watkins, Chairman of the President's Commission on the HIV Epidemic, released
just days before the first draft of this Article was completed, is exemplary of the rational employment law reforms that
are needed to ensure adequate protection from discrimination for persons affected by HIV and AIDS. Relevant portions
of the draft are available in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at D-1 (June 3, 1988). The full Commission removed
portions of the draft critical of the Reagan Administration's approach to AIDS issues, but a majority of the Commission
approved retention of the major policy recommendations relevant to employment. 3 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) No. 12, at
2 (June 29, 1988).
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